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 In order to understand how policies are made, analysts need to be able to explain 
and describe the policy making process. This is a complex task due to the variety and 
complexity of policy making environments. The difficulty lies in accounting for the 
multiple actors who come and go, differing preferences, and impending problems and 
solutions sets which vary by policy environment.  
 Therefore, there is a need to approach the understanding of policy processes from 
several different theoretical perspectives to aid in evaluating the multifaceted variations 
which ultimately affect policy making. An improved description of processes can lead to 
more accurate predictions of possible future policies, improved advocacy efforts, and 
enhanced problem solving. 
 Two policy process frameworks, the Multiple Stream Framework (MSF) and the 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, were applied to a recent 
significant change in science policy.  An understanding is developed to explain how 
federal science funding survived within the highly controversial and costly American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA).  
 The volatile and unpredictable nature of science policy lends itself well to the 
MSF, while the more static IAD is less useful to explain how and why the funds stayed in 
the bill. This is telling about the scope and adaptability of the two frameworks, where 
each may be better suited for different policy environments. The MSF being more 
appropriate for unstable and capricious policy issues and the IAD better matched for 







 Policy scholars are beginning to realize that in the multifarious world of policy 
making, a single theoretical perspective is not adequate to describe all the nuances of the 
policy making processes (Dunn 2009; Kingdon 1995; Ostrom 2005; Sabatier 2007). 
Therefore there is a need to approach policy processes from several different theoretical 
perspectives to allow an analyst to evaluate the complex variety of explicit and implicit 
structural arrangements and variables which affect policy making. 
  The complexity of policy making is due to several factors: actors can number in 
the hundreds; not all institutions and actors have the same preferences, goals, and 
interests; and actors and institutions face different problems and available solutions. In 
addition, policy making is a social process which is complicated by human cognition, 
cyclical changes,-as well as conflicts, cooperation, and competition between multiple 
actors who all attempt to influence the policy making process (Dunn, 2009).  
 The search for understanding policy processes is an exploration for causal 
linkages, testable hypotheses, and a means to combine and learn from knowledge derived 
across multi-disciplinary fields (Koonts, 2003).  Once analysts start to empirically test 
multiple perspectives which incorporate “processes of selective search, of abstraction, 
and even intuition that characterize human problem solving activity… a relatively simple 
set of symbol-manipulating processes for carrying out means-end analysis” can be 
developed (Simon, 1966, p. 23).  Using different perspectives to approach and explain 
policy processes can lead to more accurate predictions of possible future policies, 
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improve advocacy efforts for preferred policies, and possibly lead to better problem 
solving in policy domains (Simon 1966; Ostrom 2005; Sabatier 2007).  
Application 
  This case study applies two policy process frameworks to explore how policy 
ideas adapt and survive in the form of appropriations in a congressional bill and 
subsequently become law in the U.S. Congress. More specifically, this study focuses on 
funds appropriated to federal science agencies in the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA).  
  The following frameworks are applied to the case study: The Multiple Streams 
Framework (MSF) developed by John Kingdon (1995) and the Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework developed by Elinor Ostrom (2005). They will be 
assessed for their utility in explaining how S&T policy gets made.  
The Case 
  On February 17, 2009 Congress passed the ARRA, a $787 billion emergency 
supplementary appropriations bill that is passed in response to a weakening U.S. 
economy. House Appropriations Chairman, David R. Obey, describes the bill as “simply 
the largest effort by any legislative body on the planet to try and take government action 
to prevent economic catastrophe” (Clarke, 2009b). The purpose of the bill is to restore 
consumer spending power and confidence in the U.S. economy, primarily through 
adopting policy ideas which will create jobs, aid those unemployed by the recession, and 
reduce taxes. 
  Before the passage of ARRA it was known as ‘the stimulus bill’ and its journey 
through Congress was high profile, controversial in speed, size, and scope, and turned 
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into a partisan battle which threaten passage of the bill every step of the way.  The 
unusually large and somewhat unlimited budget and range of solutions being seriously 
considered attracted many issue communities to mobilize in and around Congress during 
late 2008, and early 2009, with the goal to receive favorable language and appropriations 
in the bill.  
  The appropriations of interest for this case study are  the $2.9 billion appropriated 
to the National Science Foundation (NSF), the $10.4 billion for the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH), and the $2.4 billion for the Department of Energy (DOE).  Congress splits 
these funds to be spent on basic and applied research and development (R&D), and for 
the construction and modernization of R&D facilities and equipment (The American 
Association for the Advancement of Science, 2009). The inclusion of these funds in the 
stimulus bill were initially somewhat of a surprise to the S&T community. The MSF and 
IAD are used to explain how these anomalies therefore survive in the bill.  
Data Collection 
From January to April 2009, qualitative data was collected in Washington, D.C. 
during a legislative internship with the Georgia Institute of Technology’s Office of 
Federal Relations.  My role as an intern was to take notes and observe day-to-day policy 
processes rather than actively advocating for particular policies. This paper is based on 
my own participant observations which allow me to be familiar with a variety of different 
processes and participants who were active in D.C. at the time, all working towards a 
similar goal: increasing federal funds for federal science agencies.   
Data was generated from: 14 formal interviews, informal conversations, notes 
taken at congressional hearings, interest group meetings in D.C., daily events related to 
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my internship, frequent emails from a variety of sources including a political consulting 
firm, lobbying circles, congressional constituency newsletters, and list serves from 
scientific and academic membership organizations, everyday personal observations, later 
reflections at the end of each day, and news articles which were read daily from political 
newspapers, particularly the Congressional Quarterly.  
During my internship experience, I witness lobbying efforts and political 
maneuvers before, during, and after the ARRA’s passage. I then developed a history and 
understanding about how S&T funding managed to survive in the ARRA.  
Interviews, observations, and conversations were with a variety of actors involved 
with the stimulus bill in some capacity - political consultants, congressional staffers, and 
lobbyists and representatives from higher education and scientific communities. Data 
collection was intended to facilitate an understanding of the organization and structure of 
the S&T community and how they work within Congress.  
Theories 
  There are a variety of policy process frameworks, theories, and models which set 
out to explain how and why polices are made. Besides the MSF and IAD, other 
prominent competing theories include the Stages Heuristic, the Punctuated-Equilibrium 
framework (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993), and the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
(Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1998, 1993). The MSF and IAD are chosen for use in this 
paper for different reasons. The MSF allows for intuition, flexibility and a variety of 
influencing variables which work well for the data I collected and witnessed firsthand. 
Also, past studies apply the MSF to understand the U.S. legislative policy making 
process, similar to the goal of this paper.  The IAD is chosen for its efforts to 
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compartmentalize exogenous variables and separate them from the action situation in 
order to simplify and observe patterns to policy making processes.  The vocabulary 
Ostrom developed is also of particular interest for use in describing my observations.  
Multiple Streams Framework 
  First described by John Kingdon in 1984, the MSF is intended to organize 
information and events to reveal patterns of pre-decision processes resulting in agenda 
setting, selection of policy ideas, and predicting chances for policy adoption. Essentially, 
Kingdon explains,  “the patterns of public policy, after all, are determined not only by… 
final decisions as votes in legislatures… but also by the fact that some subjects and 
proposals emerge in the first place and others are never seriously considered” (1995, p. 
2). 
  The MSF is therefore concerned with how policy ideas are narrowed down from 
many, to a particular few. Also, Kingdon is not focused on “where ideas come from, but 
what makes them catch on and survive in certain communities and certain times” 
(Kingdon, 1995, p. 226).  The MSF is more about the chance an actor finds to gain 
favorable policy change (a policy window), rather than the conflicts between coalitions or 
changing fundamental policy values and venues. Kingdon suggests that while important, 
these elements are not always mandatory for high chances of policy idea adoption. 
Over the past several years, the MSF is being  increasingly used to describe  a 
variety of policy sectors. Most recently it has been used for examining factors that put 
issues, such as childhood obesity, on legislative agendas, and later making their way into 
law (Craig,  Felix,  Walker,  & Phillips, 2010). It has been used todiscover how problems 
are identified, prioritized, and attached to policy solutions within the Canadian 
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government (Henstra, 2010), assess executive military policy-making and how it changes 
(Ellington, 2011), explore how windows of opportunities work in the case of Australian 
cannabis reform (Ritter  & Bammer, 2010), and examine the role of participant influence 
in policy making for  the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Rinfret,2011).  
  The MSF is both a macro and micro level approach that does not confine policy 
making to starting from one source or level. It does not  require the policy process to 
follow a particular sequence to policy adoption.  It describes policy making as coming 
from a variety of different sources and different actors, which change over time.  
  The main unique aspects of the MSF are the three general categories of processes 
or “streams” which contribute to agenda setting and the adoption of policy ideas: (1) The 
problem stream which includes data, definitions, and events, (2) the policy stream which 
contains all types of feasible ideas which are ready for implementation, and (3) the 
political stream which is made up of administrative or legislative changeovers, the 
national mood, and pressures on decision makers from advocacy groups.  
  One can think of these streams as “highly fluid and loosely coupled … [seeming] 
to flow through and around the federal government largely independent of one another, 
and big policy changes occur when the streams join” (Kingston, 1995, p. xiii). Observing 
the joining of the steams may be the most important part of the MSF. Kingdon suggests 
this is because the most successful actors in the policy making process are the actors that 
notice changes in the policy environment and mobilize to take appropriate action quickly. 
Once all three streams merge, a policy window will open allowing for policy change. 
This requires actors to “… be prepared, their pet proposal ready, their special problem 
well documented, lest the opportunity pass them by” (Kingdon, 1995, p 165).  
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  The foundation of this framework adopts the Garbage Can Model (GCM) of 
organizational choice and it’s the three main assumptions (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 
1972). These assumptions are: (1) actors have unclear preferences and goals; (2) no one 
completely knows how institutions work, and (3) various actors within and around 
government come and go from one decision to the next.   
  Policy makers “attend to different characteristics of the same situation each time”, 
allowing for actors to assess the current streams and make decisions about strategy and 
communications. Their preferences, interpretations, and assumptions of the policy 
environment influence them to either act or hold off for a better coupling of the streams 
(Sabatier, 2007, p. 301).  This search for and assessment of ‘perfect timing’ does not 
appear in the other policy process concepts.  
  A big misconception about the MSF is that it suggests policy making happens 
randomly. Kingdon explains while some ideas are seemingly adopted randomly, there is 
actually an underlying pattern and structure within each stream. Also Kingdon asserts all 
issues do not have an equal chance of adoption, so total randomness is not what he 
describes.  
  The probability of policy adoption is high if actors are armed with a valid problem 
and solution (problem stream), the right political environment and national mood 
(political stream), and the right piece of legislation (policy stream), according to the 
MSF.   
 Institutional Analysis and Development 
  Elinor Ostrom (2005) developed a systems approach for understanding how 
institutions and actors make policies. She explains institutions can be thought of as rules 
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which “humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions…” (p. 
3). In the Ostromian sense, policy making can be thought of as patterns of structured 
social interaction which result in the transformation of ideas into policy.   
  The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework set out to examine 
and describe elements in institutional diversity in a consistent, universal way in order to 
account for the range of interactions and processes which affect policy outcomes. The 
IAD asks questions such as “how many players are there, what moves can they make, 
what outcomes are available, what are the order of decisions, how do they value the 
moves and outcomes” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 6).   
  The IAD has two significant features. The first explains how decisions are made 
within different levels of decision making. The second feature describes foundational 
variables which are relevant to understanding outcomes across all policy making 
institutions (Ostrom 2007). The following case study will only focus on the second of 
these features.  
The IAD is also increasingly used over the years by a variety of disciplines. 
Examples of recent research include: an analysis of Ostrom’s concept of grammatical 
syntax on two pieces of U.S. legislation (Basurto, Kingsley,  McQueen,  Smith,  & 
Weible, 2010); an explanation of how institutional structures, such as rules and 
interaction affect the efficiency, usefulness, sustainability and outcomes of animal 
recording within the livestock industry (Wasike,  Kahi, & Peters, 2011); a multilevel 
assessment of Vietnams natural resources policies  (Clement,2010);  a description of 
governance structures of service delivery within mixed economies and how power at 
different levels affects rule making (Bushouse, 2011); and how policy networks are able 
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to effectively influence  rules that are being made within the policy domains of Maine 
lobster fisheries, international development assistance, and the involvement of faith-
based organizations in U.S. welfare policy (McGinnis, 2011a). 
   The IAD “assigns all relevant explanatory factors and variables to categories and 
locates these categories within a foundational structure of logical relationships” 
(McGinnis, 2011b, p. 1).  The underlying structure results in a “multitier conceptual 
map” used to explain how actors and past decisions affect subsequent decision making 
situations and their possible outcomes (Ostrom, 2005, p.14). This map allows an analyst 
to decide which assumptions to make about actors in order to predict broad patterns of 
outcomes.  
  The IAD is an “agent based model” and treats policy making equally (Ostrom, 
2005, p. 7). It does not change the structure of policy making depending on where or 
what decisions are being made. Ostrom suggests all the same basic elements show up in 
all policy making processes because the underlying structure of decision making remains 
the same.  Although Ostrom and past studies using the IAD focus mainly on common 
pool resources, implementation of rules, and the origins of institutions and polices, the 
IAD could prove useful as a tool to track, organize, and explain the policy making 
processes before decisions are made. It puts forth  questions which otherwise may go 
unasked, and brings to light influencing variables, such as possible action-outcome 
linkages and cost and benefit calculations that are made among actors, which are 
questions not specifically asked  in the MSF.   
  Ostrom admits that mapping out implicit elements which affect human behavior is 
difficult, “frequently, we are not even conscious of all the rules, norms, and strategies we 
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follow” (Ostrom, 2005, p.5). The IAD attempts to make this implicit knowledge explicit 
to policy practitioners because this knowledge directly “affect[s] incentives confronting 
individuals and their resultant behavior” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 9). 
  The IAD map starts with three basic elements which are: attributes of the 
biophysical world, rules related to the decision making situation of interest, and 
community characteristics. These elements make up the exogenous variables which 
reveal incentives going into an action situation.  
  The action situation is the social space where actors actually interact, exchange 
information, debate, dominate, and compete with each other. Therefore, it is the main 
unique, and most complicated, aspect of the IAD. Variables which are within the action 
situation are: actors, positions (denoting authority), potential outcomes, action-outcome 
linkages, control exercised, type of information generated, and costs and benefit 
calculations.  
  In addition to the three exogenous variables, and the categories within an action 
situation, the IAD outlines resulting generated interactions and their outcomes. These 
interactions and outcomes are then assessed by evaluative criteria.  The feedback, 
linkages, and sequences of these elements are important because they affect each 
consequent variable and subsequent action situation.  
The Analysis 
  Science funding in the ARRA is an interesting case. Not only is it unusual for 
S&T to be included in an economic stimulus bill, but the ARRA appropriated the biggest 
lump sum investment in the history of U.S. federal S&T funding. Despite past 
congressional consensus that investments in S&T are important, S&T usually doesn’t 
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compete well with other national priorities for limited discretionary funds (Greenburg, 
2001).  Within an unexpected stimulus bill, the 20 year old policy idea that investments 
in S&T will strengthen the U.S. economy was finally adopted and funded in the form of 
appropriations within the ARRA (Slaughter & Rhodes, 1996).  
  The next chapter of this case study will examine the policy environment before 
the ARRA was introduced to Congress. It specifically examines the problem of the U.S. 
economy, past S&T policies which creates momentum for S&T inclusion, as well as the 
S&T community and their relationships with past administrations and Congress.  This 
second chapter is especially important as it serves for building the structure, context, and 
incentives facing the S&T community affecting their decision to lobby for funds in the 
stimulus bill.  
  The third chapter describes how Congress usually operates. It examines how the 
policy environment changed for S&T given their somewhat unexpected inclusion in the 
House of Representatives first draft of the stimulus bill. The fourth chapter describes 
another change in the policy environment when the Senate’s first draft was released. This 
event changed how the rest of the bill played out through the conference report and final 
passage. The chapter looks at how the community reacted to possible cuts to science 
funding, possible deletion from the bill, and their ultimate survival in the bill.  
  The last chapter concludes with how the S&T community will move forward, 
lessons learned, and assesses how well the two frameworks were able to aid in 




POLICY ENVIRONMENT BEFORE ARRA’S INTRODUCTION IN CONGRESS 
The Economy 
  The MSF discusses the importance of problem indicators, their magnitude, 
feedback, and focus events which put certain ideas in the running for serious 
consideration for policy adoption. The IAD also assumes aspects of the biophysical 
world, such as the state of the economy affect how decisions are made and which 
solutions are chosen. 
  There were numerous public and private indications that the U.S. economy was 
headed for major trouble in 2009. There was a declared recession in December 2007 
(Business Cycle Dating Committee, 2008) and   the Dow Jones in July 2008 fell 20 
percent from its October 2007 high (The Privateer Market Letter, 2009). Unemployment 
rose to 7.2 percent in December 2008, with 6.5 million Americans out of work (U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009). Then in November 2008, the housing market 
collapsed, foreclosures were sky rocketing, financial markets were plummeting, credit 
markets were freezing, and retail sales were falling drastically (The Economic Outlook 
and Options for Stimulus 2008). 
  In response to this, throughout 2008 the George W. Bush administration (2001-
2009) passed numerous laws and “bail out” bills which were intended to save the 
economy from falling into a depression, but things were just getting worse. The scope of 
the problem grew as time was passing so there was a sense of urgency, but exactly what 
was to be done, and when, was not very clear. By the time Obama took office in 2009, 
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the US economy was looking very bleak. The following quote is a typical description of 
how people in Washington perceived the economy at the time.   
 An S&T lobbyist:  “The economy is in a crisis not seen since the Great Depression. 
Credit is frozen, consumer purchasing power is in decline, in the last four months the 
country has lost 2 million jobs and we are expected to lose another 3 to 5 million in 
the next year. Conservative economist Mark Zandi was blunt: “the economy is 
shutting down” [via email]. 
    
  The Barack Obama administration in January 2009 gave the country a sense of 
optimism about the economy and high hopes for a different direction. Many people 
started to characterize the impending crisis as follows, “President-Elect Obama's chief of 
staff, Rahm Emanuel, recently said: ‘You never want a serious crisis to go to waste.  And 
what I mean by that is an opportunity to do things you think you could not do before’" 
(Friedman, 2008).  This sentiment will be important later during the debates of the 
stimulus bill.   
  Here we can start to apply both of the frameworks. In the IAD, the economy 
significantly developed incentives for action among actors in and around Congress. 
Information is being perceived and interpreted about what the problem is and how to 
solve it.  Ostrom (2005) explains “individuals attempt to create a mental model or a 
representation of diverse situations so as to be able to make reasonable decisions....” (p. 
105).  The accuracy and interpretation of the problem in these information mental models 
factor into actor’s strategies and decisions.  
  The IAD suggests institutions are “human-constructed constraints and 
opportunities within which individual choice take place,” so it becomes very clear the 
importance of inputs such as problem indicators and definitions in policy making 
(McGinnis, 2011b, p. 170). The problem of the economy is defined as a crisis, an 
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opportunity, and with a sense of urgency. The IAD variables such as allowable actions, 
potential outcomes, and information about the structure of the upcoming action situation 
are able to be extracted here.  According to Ostrom, if a definition is interpreted by actors 
as an opportunity or a constraint, cost and benefits calculations and resulting behavior 
will reflect that interpretation..  
  Using the IAD, and the information about the economy, possible actions at this 
point are either Congress takes action and introduces a bill or Congress does not take any 
action.  Possible actions facing the S&T community are whether to lobby Congress with 
policy ideas prior to knowing there would be another stimulus bill, waiting to see if 
action would be taken, or simply not concerning themselves with another stimulus bill 
and concentrating on the next appropriation cycle.   
  At this point, the IAD leads an analyst to map out potential outcomes for the S&T 
community if they decide to lobby for funds. They either receive funding or they do not 
and efforts would be wasted.  Also, because the IAD stresses linked action situations, the 
S&T community has to consider that if they do receive funds, they would possibly 
receive fewer appropriations in the next appropriations cycle, which would be a big deal 
for the S&T community. The IAD suggests actors need more information about the 
upcoming situation in order to make more accurate assumptions about the future structure 
of a possible stimulus bill.  
  The declared recession and increasing unemployment numbers are the main focus 
events that define the magnitude of how difficult a situation the economy is in.  The 
definition and magnitude of the crisis is one of the most important variables in the MSF 
and it makes up the problem stream.  The MSF explains definitions and their 
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interpretations are important because they structure solution categories and develop 
criteria which policy ideas need to meet in order have a chance at adoption and survival 
in a bill.  
  When considering economic indicators, the MSF differentiates between a problem 
and a condition, where “conditions become defined as a problem when we come to 
believe that we should do something about them” (Kingdon, 1995, p.109). Indicators are 
not so much a declaration of a problem, as they assist in the interpretation of a situation 
or condition. They are used by actors to assess magnitudes and changes in the problem 
steam.   
  With the optimistic atmosphere, speeches, and references to the crisis as an 
opportunity there are glimpses of a policy window opening for a range of ideas to be 
considered to help the economy.  The assumption drawn, consistent with the MSF, is that 
if a new stimulus bill is introduced during the Obama administration, it may be used as an 
opportunity to enact priorities which were neglected during the Bush administration, such 
as investments in S&T.  One respondent commended on the new receptiveness of the 
Obama administration.  
Political consultant: In the Bush and Republican Congress, it was hard to get in door; 
S&T was not a community that they were interested in hearing from… the Obama 
administration didn’t want to do the same as Bush, so they were actually looking for a 
range of ideas and were actually interested in talking with the scientific communities.   
 
  To explain a bit further, the economic crisis is described as the worst since the 
Great Depression.  Solutions which were used to improve the situation during the Great 
Depression included a wide range of non-traditional policy ideas. President Franklin 
Roosevelt designed the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935, which created the 
Works Progress Administration (WPA).  This act unusually provided significant funding 
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to promote the Arts and employ artists.  This shows that what is traditionally thought of 
“stimulus”- tax cuts and building bridges- it is not always the only option. It is at the 
discretion of important actors and leaders involved in policy making. Applying the MSF, 
framing the crises as similar to the scope of the Great Depression may have formed 
assumptions within observant actors that untraditional approaches going beyond taxes 
and infrastructure would be seriously considered.    
  In the stimulus debate there are clear indicators and feedback that the economy is 
suffering, the feedback from the failed attempts of the Bush administration is quite clear 
that the economy was getting worse and unemployment was continuing to rise. The MSF 
and the IAD both explain how the variable of a weak and worsening economy contributes 
to the urgency and scope of the economic problem. This in turn aids in setting up the 
future action situation for the S&T community to make arguments that will position them 
as a solution to the problem due to past economic contributions.   
S&T problem 
  Prior to Congress dealing with the stimulus bill and an economic crisis, the S&T 
community has been struggling with a “silent” crisis of their own, compounded by 
several years of setbacks in federal funding (“Rising Above the Gathering Storm” 2007). 
Over the last decade, basic research has seen a decline in federal funding. This decline 
leaves labs, facilities, universities, programs, and scientific progress to be outdated. This 
in turn limits the innovation capacity of the U.S., while encouraging the S&T workforce 
to conduct research overseas (Castro 2009; “Rising Above the Gathering Storm” 2007). 
It also leaves the U.S. vulnerable to other countries taking the lead in S&T fields because 
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they are advancing their S&T policies and accelerating funding, while the U.S. is actually 
decreasing theirs (Castro, 2009).   
  Starting in the 1980s, a global competitiveness justification emerged from the 
S&T community calling for serious federal investments in science over the long term in 
order to remain globally competitive and develop an innovation economy for a successful 
and secure future U.S. economy (Slaughter & Rhodes, 1996).  The S&T community had 
started to make a public connection of the lack of federal funding in S&T and its 
connection to negative results in the U.S. economy and its scientific enterprise.  They 
argue that significant benefits result from investments in S&T, especially in basic 
research due to multiplier and spillover effects that can lead to additional positive, 
unintended discoveries, developments, market and job creation (Nelson, 2004).  
  When looking at S&T’s problem through the MSF, it becomes clear that S&T 
indicators in the problem stream were considered a problem, not merely a condition, by 
both the S&T community and Congress as we will soon see. During 2008, the community 
has enough bipartisan support in Congress, yet they keep struggling and competing with 
other policy ideas in the discretionary budget. This indicated a competitiveness problem 
within the community, one which will be elaborated on later.  
  The result from a problem stream perspective was that going into 2009, the 
community knows they need to stay in the conversation in the new administration and 
Congress, in hopes for better luck of funding. The stimulus bill is not yet in their sites in 
late 2008 (personal observation, March 16, 2009).  
  Perceptive S&T lobbyists, according to MSF, may have been able to take note of 
the problem stream related to the economy and see that their own problem stream, which 
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has an economic component and bipartisan support, may have a chance of meeting the 
criteria that is needed to survive in a future stimulus bill. However, there are reasons that 
the community may not have connected the two very confidently at first. The policy 
stream and politics stream also had an impact on the perception of a window opening, 
and affect the decision to spend political capital on lobbying for inclusion in a possible 
stimulus bill. 
Past policies 
  The next description of events is similar to what the MSF describes as the policy 
stream. The policy stream consists of policy ideas, goals, and values floating around 
within those policy communities. Kingdon (1995) explains new ideas do not just appear 
on the agenda, they “must have already gone through this long process of consideration, 
floating up, discussion, revision, and trying out again” (p. 127). In the following section 
we will see that this is indeed the case for S&T. This process of “softening up” as 
Kingdon refers to it, also shows up in Ostrom’s IAD in her focus on the history of 
policies that have later outcomes.  
  The IAD borrows from institutional rational choice theory which says that, “the 
valuation that participants assign to actions and outcomes” is one of the three components 
of human behavior, perceptions of opportunities and constraints faced by lobbyists and 
Congress are important to understanding the underlying policy making process (Ostrom, 
2005, p. 103). One respondent comments below on the role that individual people’s 
values play in the policy process. The assumption that policy values play a role in 
decision making is found in both frameworks.  
  Political consultant: You make value judgments in policy, if you could make all 
  decisions rationally you will have a dictatorship, so you have to make decisions  
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  based on values.  
  Using the intuition from both the IAD and the MSF, the following milestones 
show the development or ‘softening up’ of S&T and becoming an important value in 
Congress over the past 10 years, yet they always fall short when it comes to Congress 
putting their money where their values are.   
Reports build momentum 
  The MSF gives a special role to momentum. As already mentioned, new ideas do 
not just appear, they are refined and adapted to the policy environment. Also, the 
importance of past action situations and how they link to later action situations are central 
to the IAD framework, which she refers to as nested situations, within larger situations.  
 The momentum for S&T begins with an increase in reports which start popping 
up in the mid 2000’s, most notably a report which was commissioned by Congress in 
October of 2005 called “Rising above the Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing 
America for a Brighter Economic Future” (RAGS). It was  written by a committee from 
the National Academies of Sciences. Along with other reports, the RAGS brings to light 
the long term impacts of the lack of federal science investments on U.S. economic 
prosperity and global competiveness. A lobbyist for a scientific society describes, “The 
Rising Storm report was the tipping point in 2005, comparing the U.S. to other countries 
and pointing out a lack of leadership”.  
  Additional reports start to gain footing in Congress and start to influence 
legislation. In November of 2005, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi announces a Democratic 
Innovation Agenda that signals Congress’s intentions of taking a new direction with S&T 
policy. By 2007, S&T gains bipartisan support in Congress which is important for the 
political stream of the MSF.  
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The Bush administration 
  The Bush administration is considered by some to be anti-science as some 
respondents mentioned, but evidence suggests that this is not entirely true. While the 
Bush administration did have views on particular types of science and their usefulness in 
informing policy, Bush did acknowledge the connection between S&T funding and 
America’s competitiveness in several ways.  
  Bush starts to increasingly mention the importance of basic research in his 
speeches, most notably in his State of the Union address of 2006. This is  seen as a real 
victory for the S&T community because it leads people to believe the White House and 
Congress both agree S&T is  an important investment worthy of federal funding.  
  Also, after the release of the RAGS report along with Nancy Pelosi’s Democratic 
Innovation Agenda, Bush announces his American Competitiveness Initiative (ACI) in 
February 2007, which has bipartisan support in Congress. The ACI intends to do many 
things for S&T, one being to promote its role in the U.S. economy. All of ACI’s 
initiatives are intended to maintain, as well as increase U.S. competitiveness in the S&T 
domain and the global market place (Marburger, 2006).   
  In August of 2007, most of Bush’s ACI proposals are made into law in the 
America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, 
Education, and Science (COMPETES) Act.  It passes 367-57 in the House and passes by 
Unanimous Consent in the Senate.  However, while authorization is achieved, 
appropriations fall short and the momentum that had resulted in the passage of the 
COMPETES Act seems to come to an end. So, even though it made its way on the 
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agenda and managed to make some language into law, appropriations fell short, as one 
respondent commented below.  
An S&T committee staffer: Despite all the bipartisan, overwhelming support, when it 
came to appropriations, [the COMPETES Act] never got funded. There are a variety 
of reasons for this. [Although] it is hard to find anyone who was against funding for 
science, there were other things at the top of the ‘to do list’. 
 
  The IAD and MSF lead us to assume the passage of the bipartisan COMPETES 
Act makes it clear to the community that Congress believes in their ideas. While it is a 
landmark piece of legislation, the lack of actual appropriations continued to frustrate the 
community. This frustration more than likely factors into the community’s IAD mental 
models and the MSF political stream assumptions for future funding, meaning that they 
should be very calculated in their efforts because their chances are always limited by 
competition. 
  According to both the IAD and MSF, despite the lack of funding, this momentum 
is not wasted but is actually necessary.  It contributes to the softening up process in MSF 
because policy ideas are not seriously considered randomly, it is the fact that Congress 
was passing language about S&T that set up the opportunity for future funding in the 
ARRA.   
  In the IAD, the openness, vividness, and salience of communication in and out of 
the community with Congress are very much related to the accuracy of information a 
participant has regarding their environments and upcoming action situations. The passage 
of the COMPETES is evidence of S&T’s successful communication with Congress about 
their abilities. The mental model that was developed in Congress about S&T is important 
for when Congress needs to select policy ideas over others.  
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   This history of S&T in Congress can be placed in the category of control in the 
action situation within the IAD. Ostrom explains that the level of control actors have in 
choosing solutions affects resulting policies chosen. Because Congress approves of S&T 
helping the economy, S&T is an available choice for future Congresses because of its 
past bipartisan support.  
Shortfall of Fiscal Year appropriations  
  Even with all this support, the S&T community is not in a rush to assume that if 
there is another stimulus bill they will be considered for inclusion. The quote below 
describes the perspective the community had going into 2009.  
Political consultant: The arguments that were going on in 2008 for 2009 was not to 
worry about the stimulus…just focus on advocating for FY09 [regular appropriations] 
because we were worried about base numbers, because the stimulus numbers 
wouldn’t go towards the base, so the general feeling was that the stimulus was less of 
a priority because it seemed like a long shot. 
 
The context of this quote is due to an additional blow that the community experienced in 
late 2007 which affected assumptions about future strategies, action situations, and 
political streams in Congress and leads them to focus their attention elsewhere as several 
respondents mentioned. A quote below describes what happened during the FY08 
appropriations cycle.  
Political consultant: The FY08 appropriations were a fight with Bush and Democrats.  
There was a $22 billion difference from top line numbers of the President and 
Congress’s budgets. The Democrats pushed [to keep] the $22, but Bush [wouldn’t 
allow it].  This type of thing is usually settled by compromising in the middle. So 
Democrats came back in November/December [2007] with $11 billion. Bush said 
‘No.’. He was more interested in a line in sand then governing and Democrats had no 
leverage.  So science got screwed from $11 to zero.  
 
S&T is once again a casualty of a limited budget and a lot of S&T agencies and their 
programs are negatively affected and frustrated by these cuts as another quote notes.  
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S&T committee staffer:  Bush had enough votes to have a veto, so a lot got cut to 
make up the $22 billion difference. Democrats joked that all of a sudden now Bush is 
a fiscal conservative while they were trillions of dollars in deficit. The cuts they had 
to make hurt a lot of programs.  
 
  From the perspective of the IAD and MSF, the laws passed by Congress were 
evidence of a successful repeated communication between and within the S&T 
community and Congress. However, in regards to appropriations and using the MSF, the 
feedback the S&T community continues to receive is  that in the end, they do not meet 
some criteria necessary to beat out other appropriation items; they need to fight harder 
and strategize better.  
  The two frameworks force an analyst to consider the past neglect and explain why 
the S&T community does not anticipate having a role in the rumored stimulus bill.  A 
closer look at the community gives us a better idea of the mental models the community 
develops before the House numbers are released, and shed some light on why the 
community is somewhat surprised to be including in the bill.  
The Community 
  S&T policy in the federal government is very complex and hard to follow for 
many people including veterans who have been closely involved in it for decades. The 
quote below explains this.   
Lobbyist for a scientific society: When people want to know how science policy 
works, they don’t understand that it happens at so many levels and so many different 
agencies are involved. Science policy is very different from other types of policies for 
this type of reason. A lot of it doesn’t happen in legislation… Science policy is a 
process. 
 
This makes any coordination effort difficult and tends to get policy done on an 
incremental basis (Neal, Smith, & McCormick 2008). While a lot of S&T policy is done 
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at regulation and interpretation levels, one of the most important aspects of S&T policy is 
done during the writing of the annual appropriation bills in Congress. 
  There is no Department of Science in the U.S. federal government. This means 
the jurisdictions of S&T lay in the hands of “more than thirty cabinet-level departments 
and federal agencies providing funding for, or have a role in, science and engineering 
research” (Neal et al, 2008, p.26). The S&T communities then learn to evolve strategies 
to manage this fragmentation and coordinate their efforts, sometimes taking advantage of 
the decentralization. 
  Outside of the government there are a variety of nongovernment entities which 
are interested in federal science agencies annual appropriations. These include a range of 
higher education associations, scientific societies, coalitions, ad hoc advocacy groups, 
think tanks, policy support organizations, and industry. All of these entities have 
something to gain and lose with the size of federal science appropriations (Neal et al, 
2008). 
  Kingdon calls these entities policy entrepreneurs. They can be essentially anyone 
who uses their resources to push their group’s policy ideas and attempt to influence 
policy making.  Because in the MSF anyone can be a source of agenda setting and 
alternative specification, the framework is designed to give insight  to why a particular 
person or group of people is able to wield influence on the policy making process.  
  For this case study, some of the more prominent S&T groups who are involved in 
lobbying for S&T funds  in the stimulus after the House draft is released are: individual 
universities with a high level of research activity, such as the Georgia Institute of  
Technology;  Higher Education associations such as the Association of Public and Land-
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grant Universities (APLU);  Scientific coalitions such as the Coalition for National 
Science Funding (CNSF); multi-sector collaboration groups such as the Task Force on 
American Innovation;  and  scientific societies such as the American Associations for the 
Advancement of Science (AAAS).  
  Using the MSF and IAD one can examine these groups and their missions to 
make assumptions about shared values and resources. These groups all share an overall 
goal of increasing the research money that goes to federal science agencies. They have 
frequent interaction with each other through regular meetings, newsletters, and email 
alerts. During my internship, there is an event held by at least one, if not several, of these 
organizations every day of the week. In each meeting, I hear the same conversations and 
vocabulary about the same issues, with minor additions as the days pass.  Frequent 
attendance and email alerts allow a lobbyist to pick up on the nuances of the day to day 
progression of the community’s lobbying efforts and what they are learning about 
Congress and their particular policy of interest.  
  Both the IAD and MSF give importance to the use of similar conversations, 
vocabularies, values, and goals within a community in order to have accurate 
expectations about policies generated within these communities.  If the community is 
divided and approaches Congress with conflicting messages, there is risk of total failure 
or unpredictable results. However, consensus is not a necessary condition for a policy to 
be adopted, according to Kingdon.  
  For Ostrom, attributes of the community affect incentives in an action situation 
which are either explicitly or implicitly considered, therefore differences in things such as 
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goals and values can lead to false assumptions about the structure of a situation, possible 
outcomes, and actions. 
  The S&T community is a small, tight-knit group where most everyone has 
worked with each other for several years, whether on Capitol Hill in past positions or 
they met through the S&T networks. Every year these organizations mobilize their 
memberships on Congress for the next year’s “ask”, which is generally a written request 
for some percent increase in appropriation levels from the previous year.  
  While their overarching goal is the same, to increase funds for federal research 
agencies, each group naturally has their target agencies which they stand to benefit from. 
The IAD specifically looks at these inequalities and historical conflicts to form better 
assumptions about the outcome of the process. For the purposes of this case study 
however, in the lobbying efforts for the stimulus bill, just about everyone was advocating 
for an increase in funds for S&T in general, not just a particular agency, so these 
underlying inequalities do not dominate in this case.  This may be due to a rational that 
increasing the funds for overall science will benefit everyone in the community in some 
way and the particulars will be determined by the federal agencies themselves later. Also, 
having one message of ‘science is important’ is central to be perceived as a united 
community by Congress.  
  Going into January 2009, the S&T community is hesitant to lobby for stimulus 
funding. There are several reasons for this hesitation and  their uncertainty is warranted. 
The IAD explains a rule of thumb that develops from repeated failures and factored into 
the community’s information processing.  When people are in repetitive situations, as 
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S&T lobbyist are every year, they come to develop patterns and are able to have a good 
sense of reaction and receptivity of their proposals.  
  In the S&T community, advocates are learning that the annual battle of the fiscal 
year appropriations is the arena they need to survive in, so a lot of effort and political 
capital is needed, therefore making it a risky move to lobby for stimulus funds when S&T 
may not be seriously considered for inclusion in the first place. 
  Therefore, the S&T community start off their lobbying efforts in 2009 more 
concerned with the FY09 appropriations (which are not all passed on time 2008), rather 
than trying to be part of the ambiguous stimulus, which no one really knows  what it 
would include or if would even exist.  
  The IAD stresses the importance of learning by actors from one action situation to 
the next. Not only does learning take place, but values and beliefs develop over time, 
explained by both the IAD and MSF, in response to changing environments and action 
situations. The IAD explains that internal information processing mechanisms of the 
community control a rash decision to lobby for funds that may not have a great chance to 
come to fruition.  
  The S&T community and Congress are in separate streams in the MSF. This is 
because the MSF assumes they function by different dynamics and incentives, although 
they are loosely coupled.  The S&T community is located in the policy stream, working 
on floating ideas around, and adapting them to current agenda items. They are affected by 
community interactions and values and are concerned with meeting criteria determined 
by the political and problem streams. Congress is in the political stream because they are 
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affected by things like national mood. They also have different incentives and goals that 
the S&T community such as reelection and the concern for their particular constituencies.   
  As just about all respondents comment, being included in the bill with such high 
numbers is  unexpected by the community. This is because they are so concerned and 
preoccupied with the FY09 appropriations. An explanation cannot be found from 
Kingdon, Ostrom, or my observations which can elucidate exactly how S&T is first 
placed in the ARRA.   This story is more about survival in the stimulus bill rather than 
their traditional lobbying roles of first influencing the agenda and/or getting a policy idea 
initially seriously considered.  
  From my observations, the surprise that the community experienced at their 
significant inclusion in the bill does not diminish their role in policy making; it just 
changes the process from actively advocating for inclusion, to reacting and actively 
advocating for their survival. Had there been no community to encourage their 
persistence in the bill and lobby congressmen, the controversial nature of the bill could 
have doomed S&T to its seemingly familiar fate in Congress as being considered not 
imperative enough to make it into law.   
  The MSF allows such a seemingly random start of the process result because the 
past does not always dictate the future in policy making; it is always about the present 
environment, unlike the IAD.  In the MSF, histories can cross each other in unrelated 
decision situations, affecting the same outcomes.  
  Only using the IAD to tell the story is difficult. One has to make sure all histories 
are accounted for because it is not always obvious which are relevant until after the 
outcome is decided. Ostrom places great emphasis on the origin of a decision, where the 
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MSF specifically does not. Perhaps a deeper analysis, richer information, and the ability 
to have observed processes at the higher Congressional and presidential levels could 
reveal the role actors played in getting S&T in the bill in the first place  
  One can have a bit of optimism in the MSF that streams can come together 
differently and eventually work in its favor. Where the IAD is more cumbersome and 
complicated when trying to assess an array of possibly relevant histories and optimistic 
opportunities are not always intuitive. Although both the funds included in the ARRA 
were a bit unexpected due to a lack of concerted lobbying effort, both frameworks can 
explain the steps  
Congress and S&T relationships 
  Following the structure of the MSF, here we consider aspects of the political 
stream that leads to S&T bipartisan support in Congress. The quote below is a typical 
explanation.   
Q: Why were you so confident S&T would stay in the Stimulus bill?  
A lobbyist for a scientific organization:  If you are realistic, you can never be too 
sure. But from watching it and knowing the weight Obama put on science during his 
campaign and Pelosi doing the same thing with her pro science speeches, and 
combined with the fact that in most cases science is not controversial, [I was pretty 
sure].  [Americans] want to have cures for cancer or [our energy crisis]. These are 
things Americans care about… [Also] voting against S&T is not perceived to be 
politically popular… [and it is] not a political hard sell”.  
 
  From my interviews, it seems the community feels it is hard to find members in 
Congress who are completely against S&T funding, especially because a lot of Congress 
members have federal labs and Universities in their districts, and they can claim they are 
finding a cure for cancer or solution for energy issues. The rule of thumb I observed is 
that S&T funding is a valid bipartisan idea and that it is unusual for a congressman to 
outright vote against S&T funding. 
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  Another element in the political stream which has significant weight in both the 
MSF and IAD was the change in presidential administration and a new Congress.  In the 
MSF these changes are one aspect of the political stream, while in the IAD they affect 
who is in what position, which changes the structure of a situation by changing 
preferences, goals, and interpretations. Along with all the information a participant has, 
their position also determines possible actions that are allowed to take place and the 
amount of control they have over the final outcome.  
  From the MSF, we should also pay attention to the national mood starting in 
2009. The mood of the nation was one of fear and hope of government action with the 
new Obama administration.  Government agencies, most professionals, and academics 
claim 2008 was one of the worst years since the Great Depression.  Also in regards to 
science funding, public opinion polls about basic research found that a majority of 
Americans feel S&T has a positive effect on the U.S. society and quality of life (Pew 
Research Center for the People and the Press, 2009).  
  In the IAD, national mood plays a role in the mental models participant have 
about their future decisions and actions, but does not have a specific role within the 
framework. Lobbyist worry about the moods of people they are representing, while 
congressmen worry about their constituents. Having an accurate assessment of expected 
behavior and proper language is a critical skill that has to be learned over time.   
Obama’s role 
  Leadership is an important element in the political stream of the MSF. It has 
historically played a big role in generating significant S&T policy. If the president or 
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Congressional leaders think that S&T can be part of a solution to a particular problem, 
S&T stands to benefit. The following quote illustrates this dynamic.  
A lobbyist for a scientific society: [Significant science policy] is all about the 
President’s response. You have…President [Obama] who came into a situation, an 
energy situation that was not too big a crisis since the oil prices declined. But when 
the financial markets crashed, he had a window with the stimulus and he decided 
science would be the solution. It was his chance to throw as much money in one bill 
as possible. [The] choice started with the President and then was endorsed by 
Congress.  
 
  Obama was a supporter of S&T from the very beginning of his presidential 
campaign, and although promises that are made during campaigns do not always receive 
follow through, the S&T community was more than happy to hear public statements of 
support for S&T. 
  The S&T community starts to interpret hints of a promising role to play in the 
Obama administration. In just about all of my interviews, respondents mention the 2008 
presidential campaign trail where Obama makes numerous campaign speeches that 
include his views about the importance of S&T, such as doubling investments in basic 
research. On November 26, 2008 Obama releases his Innovation agenda. The purpose of 
this agenda is to announce his intention to bring the federal government into the 21st 
century and restore S&T’s place in Congress and the economy, setting the tone and 
expectations for his administration.  
  In the IAD perspective, this information will fall into the working rules of the 
community. The fact that Obama is making public speeches is a possible signs of good 
things to come, but then again, Bush made similar speeches and his policies always fell 
short. While the community is starting to be excited about possibilities, the working rules 
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that developed through history leaves them reluctant to assume Obama’s speeches and 
language are more than just that.   
  In 2008, Democrats gain the majority in the House and Senate and with a 
Democratic President coming into office in 2009, the general understanding was that 
Democratic agenda items are going to receive priority, and S&T tends to be a Democratic 
priority (personal communication, April 13, 2009).   
  President Obama hits the ground running by assembling transition teams to  are 
reach out to the S&T community in late November (Tollefson 2009). Applying the MSF, 
these early contacts are critical to merging the three streams and allowing the community 
to better take advantage of the policy window that is opening after the House draft is 
released.   
  Obama’s transition teams are very receptive to the S&T community and are eager 
to get conversations going (personal communication, April 13, 2009).  Informal and 
formal meetings start to take place between important figures in the S&T community and 
the transition teams. Meetings were with the heads of NASULCG (now APLU) and 
AAU, as a lobbyist for a higher education organization explained, “there was a lot of 
back and forth going on”.  
  Before the election, no one knew for sure who will be President but this does not 
stop communities from mobilizing and working with presidential campaign teams to 
educate and provide information for the presidential candidates, as two respondents 
explained and the quote below suggests.  
A lobbyist for a higher education organization:  After Obama was president the 
possibility for S&T increased dramatically, [especially] because there was 
discussion about science during the campaigns. [Also] there was a science debate 
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among the candidates which had interviews with Obama and McCain. It may 
have worked out well for science had [John] McCain won too.  
 
In the IAD, making the right assumptions about actors is one of the hardest and most 
important aspects of the framework.  So these early connections and speeches are very 
helpful in forming important expectations about Obama values in science, according both 
frameworks.  
   A political consultant explains, an additional signal of Obama’s support for S&T 
is the creation of his very prestigious and “aggressive science advisory team” for his 
campaign that was chaired by Harold Varmus, a Nobel laureate and former director of the 
National Institutes of Health. Moreover, when Obama announces his choices for his 
science appointments, it added to S&T’s optimism about their role in his administration 
as the following quote explains.  
Political consultant: In Obama’s campaign, there was a push for OSTP to be more 
important. [Then] Holdren’s appointment announcement was a sign that OSTP will 
play big role in administration, which signaled that good things will happen and that 
the President [believed] investments in science [were] fundamental to the economy.  
   
  According to the Chairmen of the House Science and Technology Committee, 
Rep. Bart Gordon D-TN, when first meeting Obama,  the then President-elect introduced 
himself as “a science guy” (Wolfe, 2009). All of these things are symbolically important 
for the S&T community because they show how Obama does indeed understand the role 
science plays in his administration.   
More signs  
  In addition to Obama’s leadership, words, and actions, there are other signals of 
S&T’s place within the new Congress. Nancy Pelosi has always been outspoken about 
the role of S&T in the economy, as the following respondent discusses.   
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An S&T committee Staffer: Pelosi was a strong advocate in the House. It was not just 
a parochial interest for her….she has seen the good S&T can do. When she started as 
Speaker people asked her what was on the agenda, she said ‘science, science, 
science’. Then some time later when they asked her that same question, she added the 
4th science to stress her interest. She just has a strong conviction about science. You 
can be cynical and say it’s about her district [being in Silicon Valley, so] there is 
political reason for her [S&T] advocacy, but she wins in elections with 90% of the 
vote, so it is not about keeping her seat…she just believes it is good policy. Same 
with Gordon, [he doesn’t just support science] because he wants more votes. Gordon 
knows what science can do to serve the national good.  
 
Later, to the delight of the S&T community, Pelosi is increasingly giving speeches 
promoting the role of science in the stimulus bill (Mervis 2009a). The following 
respondent notes the excitement.  
A lobbyist for a higher education organization: It wasn’t until November/December 
[2008] that I was sure of the role science would play. Everything changed when [the 
incoming Obama] administration indicated interest and Pelosi became more vocal, 
[which] happened in November. She was talking about the need to include 
science…One person from the X group was at a fundraiser in Oregon in November 
for their members delegation where Pelosi was speaking, and she first said her mantra 
of Science times four, that …person called me so excited and said “oh my god- she 
just said science times four!” It gave us lots of hope.  
 
   Combining all of Obama’s and Pelosi’s public statements and actions, as well as 
the relationship formed and information exchanged with transition teams, the S&T 
community is encouraged that S&T will play a role in the new administration- just what 
role is uncertain, as a political consultant comments, “the seeds were planted” for S&T to 
be a success in the Obama administration.  
  Another signal of S&T’s possible role comes in December 2008. A significant 
meeting takes place at Princeton University that consists of many members of Congress 
and prominent S&T advocates who are promoting science and its ability to help restore 
the U.S. economy. One of these actors is Norm Augustine, former CEO of Lockheed 
Martin and main author of the RAGS report.  Also in early January, the House 
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Democratic Steering committee holds a hearing with similar witnesses to further discuss 
S&T’s role in a possible stimulus bill.  The next day on January 8, the NAS releases a 
report, “Beyond Fortress America” that discusses S&T and globalization.  Also on that 
day, Obama makes a speech at George Mason University making a public appeal for 
S&T and the stimulus bill.  
  These events are important clues and provide momentum for the S&T 
community, according to the MSF. These events factor into the expectation of actors 
because with influential people spending their scant time and attention talking about the 
connection of the economy and science, it is bound to take some form in the new 
Congress, perhaps just closer in the future then they expect. Half of the battle described 
by the MSF is staying relevant in the policy conversations and S&T is proving that it 
could.  
  In the IAD, most of what was just described falls into the input categories of the 
action situations. What Ostrom refers to as the working components of an action 
situation, “participants in positions who must decide among diverse actions in light of the 
information they possess about how actions are linked to potential outcomes and the cost 
and benefits assigned to actions and outcomes” (McGinnis, 2011b, p. 173-174). Now the 
action situation regarding the decision for S&T to lobbying for Stimulus funds is 
beginning to take shape because actors in leadership roles in the government understand 
what investments in S&T’s can do for the economy, and the community takes  note.   




POLICY ENVIRONMENT AFTER ARRA’S INTRODUCTION IN THE HOUSE 
OF REPRESENTATIVES 
How Congress usually works 
  In order to appreciate the process and events which take place during the stimulus 
bill’s passage, it is important to understand the nuances and rules in Congress which 
actually affect which policy ideas are chosen to be included in a bill.  We can start by 
looking at the differences of the rules in the House from those in the Senate. The quote 
below describes a perception of the difference. 
Science policy fellow: In the Senate anyone is a player. The House leadership was big 
[during the stimulus bill] because they can pass what they want. The House can 
control amendments, where in the Senate they can’t stop amendment from being 
made 
 
  People refer to how things get done in the Senate as herding a bunch of wild cats. 
This is because it is more of a ‘free for all’ in terms of debate rules and the amendments 
that are allowed to be proposed on the floor. Individual Senators have more power than a 
House Representative and therefore would have more influence on a bill’s content and 
passage, but in the end, both chambers need to agree.  
  The IAD stresses the importance of rules in structuring an action situation, and 
applying the IAD to this case study, the role rules play becomes very apparent. During 
the stimulus debate, the House has206 amendments submitted for floor consideration, but 
only 11 are allowed by the House Rules committee to be voted on (Allen, 2009). 
Generally, the chairwomen of the Rules committee is to choose which amendments are 
worthy of a floor vote. For the stimulus bill, the chairwomen reports that amendments are 
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chosen based on their relevancy, ability to stimulate, as well as their price tags, which can 
be a very subjective and partisan process (Allen, 2009). 
  Rules in the House also dictate the duration of floor debates. Before the House 
draft is released, members of the House complain that they wanted more time for 
committee consideration, such as the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, but 
the Democratic leadership responds that they already held enough hearings and provided 
plenty of time for debate (Clarke, 2009a). 
   When it comes time for the merger of bills from both chambers, the leaderships, 
key chairmanships, and senior staff have a lot of influence on bills and their contents, 
especially through their use of rules and procedures. As the following quote points out, 
things can change when the bill gets to the conference committee. It is then that the 
leadership can decide who will participate in the negotiations, giving them significant 
control over the final contents of a bill. 
Personal notes from a conversation with a lobbyist from a research university: [We 
spoke about] the process of how a bill becomes a law regarding the stimulus. In 
theory … the Senate and House agree on a version, then both the leaders of the 
chambers agree on one version, and then it goes to the President. But in reality… it is 
way more complicated than that… 
 
…The leaders of the House and Senate as well as key appropriators are definitely 
involved in merging them together. They can decide to include minority leaders if 
they want but do not have to. Since the leaders are from the majority party, it does 
lead to partisan bills, especially in this case because the President and Congress are 
Democrats…[The respondent] said that they will more than likely include 
McConnell, the Senate minority leader, but probably won’t let the House minority 
leader in because they don’t need Republican support in the House to get it passed. 
But since Obama wants to have this as a bipartisan bill, they may choose to allow 
more Republicans to be at the final decision table and may give them some legislation 





Thus, even after a committee amends contents within its jurisdiction, provisions and 
language can appear and disappear in the final conference report at what seems like the 
whim and preferences of the conference committee members and the leaderships. 
Staffers’ role 
  Staffers play a significant role in Congress. They are a powerful stepping stone 
for issues to make their way on, first a Congress members’ agenda, and later the 
Congressional agenda.  Therefore, staffers are high priority targets for lobbyist. They also 
have their own lobbying role in Congress. Staffers from one committee or congressional 
office frequently lobby other staffers with information that is favorable to their respective 
jurisdictional priorities. This lobbying, which leads to relationship building between 
staffers in different jurisdictions, is an important part of the legislative process, as the 
following quote describes.  
S&T committee Staffer: [By the time the stimulus debates began], appropriators had 
developed much better relationships in last two years with S&T staffers and [S&T 
committee] members. They had to make hard decisions [in the past] that people 
weren’t so happy about but…but the lines of communication were more open …in 
the past two years there was a lot of relationship building.  
 
  Senior staffers hold valuable institutional knowledge that can make or break 
lobbying and legislative efforts.  Therefore the rule of thumb is to always get staffers on 
your side and always invite them to your events. When relationships are established, 
staffers then reach out to trusted circles of lobbyists and other staffers for policy ideas 
and information to push issues from the inside. 
  During the stimulus debate there are a number of staffers who attend S&T 
community meeting, either to simply listen, or to actively inform the community of 
insider information like the mood of particular members and their values. They play a 
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significant role in informing the community as to what arguments members of Congress 
are expecting and looking for (i.e. job numbers).  
  In the MSF, positions are less important in determining policy outcomes, it is 
more about the direction and flow of a stream, regardless of who is steering it. This is 
because of the weight he puts on all actors, everyone can be an entrepreneur irrespective 
of formal authority. Also, the MSF accounts for the fact that while policy communities do 
not have any authority in Congress, they do have a significant role to play in the policy 
stream and ultimate idea adoption in the form of information gathering and sharing with 
Congress.  
  The quote below suggests informal positions do have some weight that affects the 
action situation indirectly.     
A lobbyist for a higher education organization: [In mid-January there was a hearing 
held by the House Democratic Steering and Policy Committee which] included 
economists and [Norman] Augustine as witnesses. That hearing was also really 
indicative of strong support for science in the stimulus… Augustine really spoke 
about the importance of including science in bill…[I] spoke with him for a second 
afterwards to thank him for his comments, he told me ‘don’t settle for too little, you 
have to ask for more’. I found this helpful and encouraging that science will make it.   
 
  The position that Norman Augustine holds in the S&T community is a significant 
one, even though he does not have any formal authority in Congress. Augustine is the 
former chief executive officer of the Lockheed Martin Corporation, is currently a 
member of the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, and has been 
awarded many prestigious honors for his science advocacy. Most notably he played a big 
role in the writing of the RAGS report and continues to advocate for increasing support 
for S&T in Congress.   
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  His testimony to Congress and conversation with the above lobbyist carried 
enough weight to encourage the lobbyists to have confidence in their lobbying efforts. 
Without such a direct comment, the lobbyist’s personal efforts, as well as the information 
shared with the community afterwards, maybe weaker if there not been that brief 
conversation with Augustine. 
  The IAD gives a special role to positions, “each of which has a unique 
combination of resources, opportunities, preferences, and responsibilities” (McGinnis, 
2011b, p. 174). Ostrom (2005) explains positions link actors and their actions. The role of 
lobbyists seems to be confined to the community attributes category in the IAD, which is 
located outside the action situation, separate from debates and relevant conversations. 
While it makes sense that staffers and Congress members who have denoted authority in 
Congress are most relevant in an action situation, intuitively it suggests that lobbyists 
play a lesser role.  On the other hand, the MSF lets these actors such as lobbyists, staffers 
and congressmen be intuitively thought of as affecting the policy outcome at the same 
time as members of Congress, with the possibility of equal weight, depending on the 
current policy environment.  The quote below supports this suggestion. 
Personal observation: It seems pretty clear how voting works when you look at the 
D.C. voting rights act. Someone slipped in a gun rights amendment [loosening current 
law] that can kill the whole bill. The NRA is playing a huge role in this because they 
are going to count votes, and [the Congressmen] that vote against [the amendment], 
may lose voters because of the NRA's connections to businesses and large voting 
bases. By going back and seeing who supported the amendment, [the NRA] could tell 
their members to vote for a particular candidate during reelection.” 
 
Irregular order 
  The stimulus bill takes a different course through Congress then a bill usually 
takes. Speaker Pelosi states to the House Democrats during the Stimulus debate that once 
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the stimulus legislation is signed by the President, things will return to “regular order” 
and normal floor procedures will resume. In a way she is confirming criticisms that the 
House leadership is using procedural tactics to push the stimulus bill through the House 
without the usual opportunities for debate and proposals (Epstein, 2009b).The quote 
below illustrates one of the common perceptions of the time about how the bill was dealt 
with in Congress.  
Senior Congressional Staffer: No Republicans or rank and file Democrats were 
included in the Debate. [There was] no full inclusion in the drafting of the legislation. 
It was definitely a top down approach, although some Democrats may say otherwise. 
(Epstein 2009a) 
 
  This lack of regular order adds to the unpredictability of the stimulus bill’s 
processes and its contents. In the MSF this irregular order does not change the processes 
of how an idea is taken into serious consideration. The MSF is about policy change and 
policy ideas coming from multiple places, not particular sequences or a predetermined 
path- which are defined by rules in Congress.  While the MSF cannot predict which 
policy ideas will be selected in the final bill, it is meant to assist in developing an 
intuition about possible ideas which have a good chance of surviving, whether there is 
regular order or not.  The irregular order only changes the opportunities and signals 
actors have to interpret to be able to effectively adapt their solution to the current policy 
environment. Experienced actors, according to the MSF, will intuitively know what their 
next step should be regardless of regular order.  
  The IAD approaches this lack of regular order differently. Regular order, or in 
other words, predictable rules are important in terms of allowing actors to know what 
actions are allowed. When regular order is placed aside there are a lot of unknowns about 
possible actions, structures, and therefore outcomes.  The IAD does acknowledge that 
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when rules are unstable, the resulting situation will be unpredictable. Unlike the intuition 
which actors could use in the MSF, the IAD seems to need to let the situation play out 
further to see what rules will be followed, in order for actors to make accurate 
assumptions in the resulting action situation. Once the rules in use are decided, the IAD 
allows for an assessment of their meanings, interpretations, and outcomes. Ostrom refers 
to these as institutional statements and grammar. 
Jurisdiction 
  Given the top down approach of the stimulus bill’s passage through Congress, as 
political consultant explains to me, this leads to limited committee jurisdiction and the 
reduction of individual member’s involvement in the crafting of the stimulus legislation. 
The following quote illustrates how jurisdictional power wars are a regular occurrence in 
the U.S. Congress and how it can directly affect the content of legislation.  
Personal notes from a conversation with a lobbyist for a research university: Say a 
committee staffer writes up a bill (members normally do not do this). Then [the 
parliamentarian] will reference certain other committees that need to approve the bill 
in order for it to be considered. [The respondent] said the savvy staffer will want the 
bill to go through the least possible number of committees and of course prefer to 
only go through their own committee. So the staffer could ask [the parliamentarian] 
what parts of the bill caused [the bill] to be referenced to other committees. Then the 
staffer will manipulate the bill to scratch out the need to involve another committee. 
The more committees, the more convincing and compromise needs to take place. 
[The respondent] said that there is significant power within committees and none of 
them are willing to give up their powers, and are very obsessed with their 
jurisdictions.  
 
  Due to the perceived urgent nature of the economy, there are changes in the 
regular policy making process. This urgency is evidenced by their self-imposed February 
17th deadline and the fact that the stimulus bill has very limited committee jurisdiction in 
Congress, although it proposes numerous solutions, language, and appropriations. Under 
different circumstances it is likely the bill would fall within multiple jurisdictions.  After 
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the House’s stimulus bill is introduced in early January, the bill is only officially referred 
to the House Appropriations and Budget Committees. This restricts the amount of debate 
and input that goes into the first House draft, which allowed the bill to proceed through 
the House quickly and with mostly democratic leadership priorities.  
  Expanding jurisdiction at this time would delay the bills movement through the 
policy process.  This speed and exclusion of additional jurisdiction stirs a lot of anger and 
concern among House members, but may be a factor in improving S&T’s chances for 
inclusion by simply skipping the regular order of tedious multiple markup hearings which 
take place when additional committees and sub committees are included.   
 
  The discussion of jurisdiction falls under different aspects of the IAD, such as 
positions, boundary rules, and design principles for enduring institutions. Each position 
has a determined action set which is constrained and determined by level of authority. 
Pelosi is the obvious example of a position wielding its authority to structure the action 
situation in order to control the contents of the stimulus bill.  According to the IAD, 
reducing the number of actors in positions leads to fewer preferences and action sets 
available to choose from, which is exactly the point.  
  In the political stream, the MSF explicitly addresses jurisdiction as a “central 
governmental process” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 155). Jurisdiction affects many aspects of 
agenda setting and policy ideas chosen. Staffers are known to cause ideas to be “‘defined 
away’ by the drawing of jurisdictional boundaries” (Kingdon, 1995, p.155). When bills 
span multiple committees, government action is stifled according to Kingdon.  
  Given the urgent nature of the economy, the congressional leadership takes 
advantage of the actions which are within their action sets, defined by their positions. 
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They were able to speed the process and bypass the jurisdictional boundaries that would 
have likely slowed, if not killed, the stimulus bill.  
Lobbying 
  When someone outside Congress wants to exert any influence on member of 
Congress regarding a policy idea, getting a meeting with at least the relevant 
congressional or committee staffer is important. The goal is to have a clear and relevant 
enough policy idea that can be easily understood and able to adapt and survive though its 
passage in Congress (personal observation, January 26, 2009) 
  Here the importance of the mental models is found in the IAD and the softening 
up process of the MSF policy stream. Ostrom (2005) explains policy making as policy 
“experiments based on more or less informed expectations about potential outcomes and 
the distribution of these outcomes for participants across time and space” (p. 243). It is 
the role of actors in policy communities to inform staffers and members of Congress of 
expectations and possible outcomes.  
The ARRA 
  The actual congressional debate on the stimulus bill starts in the beginning of 
January 2009. The context of the debate is centered on partisan politics from the very 
beginning. Before its introduction in the House, the proposed stimulus package is being 
estimated to cost around $700 billion to $1.3 trillion, with the expectation of creating 
about 3 million jobs (Clarke & Schatz, 2009).  Also, statements made by Pelosi suggest 




  The speed of the bill through Congress is one of the most controversial parts of 
the stimulus story. Pelosi makes it clear that Congress is going to move quickly to help 
relieve the unemployed and provide Americans impacted by the recession with 
immediate relief. Expectations are that this bill will get passed in six weeks. Just in time 
for Obama to sign the bill before the President’s Day recess on February 17, 2009. Pelosi 
says they will not leave for the recess if the bill is not ready for the President to sign 
(Epstein, 2009d).  Historically, deadlines in Congress tend to encourage compromise, 
because when there is no deadline, negotiations do not take place until the last moments 
of a bill, so a tight timeframe is appropriate to force consensus (Schick, 2007). 
  While some lawmakers feel early on that this is a do-able timeline, others felt they 
do not have the time to properly consider the bill to make an informed vote (Clarke & 
Schatz, 2009; Krawzak & Clarke 2009; Schatz & Clarke 2009a). Exactly how big and 
diverse the package is was not yet clear, but unemployment benefits, tax cuts, 
infrastructure spending, and aid to states are part of the public conversation from the very 
start (Schatz & Clarke 2009a; Clarke 2009a) 
  From the perspective in Congress, the main obstacles to overcome are the 
Republicans in the Senate and the fiscally conservative Blue Dog Coalition in the House. 
They warned the Democratic leadership that unless Obama made clear his intentions to 
be fiscally responsible and takes steps to address the growing national debt, they will not 
be voting for the House bill (Clarke 2009b). The Blue Dogs are the only real threat to the 
House’s passage of the bill, because the House has a large Democratic majority, and the 




House draft  
  On January 15, 2009 House Resolution 1 (H.R.1) is introduced by Appropriations 
Committee Chair, Representative David Obey. He is considered one of the main 
architects of the bill, along with Pelosi. There are nine original Democratic sponsors, all 
of which are Chairmen of their respective committees: Representatives Barney Frank, 
Financial Services; Bart Gordon, Science and Technology; George Miller, Education and 
Labor; James Oberstar, Transportation and Infrastructure; Charles Rangel, Ways and 
Means Committee; John Spratt, Budget Committee; Edolphus Towns, Oversight and 
Government Reform; Nydia Velazquez, Small Businesses; and Henry Waxman, Energy 
and Commerce.  
  When mapped out by the IAD, observing that Representative Bart Gordon of the 
S&T committee is one of the original sponsors of the bill, will allow an analyst to assume 
S&T will be included somehow in the bill.   
  The House passes H.R.1 on January 28 without a single Republican vote and with 
eleven Democratic votes against the bill, 244-188. 
Definitions 
  The bill, as stated in the first draft of H.R.1 is, “…making supplemental 
appropriations for job preservation and creation, infrastructure investment, energy 
efficiency and science, assistance to the unemployed, and State and local fiscal 
stabilization…” (2009).  
  In addition to science being explicitly included in the main purpose of the bill, 
H.R.1 also includes significant appropriations for S&T’s related federal agencies, such as 
NSF, NIH, and DOE. This language and appropriations let the S&T community know 
47 
 
that they need to mobilize and advocate for their survival in the bill by making a good 
case for their relevancy and abilities to stimulate the economy.  
  As already mentioned, in the MSF the definition of the problem is very important 
in determining the categories of choices worthy of being in the solution set to address the 
problem. Once a condition is determined to be a problem, as evident through the 
introduction of H.R.1, categories are determined from the subsequent problem 
definitions. Science is included as a valid solution to the economic crisis. From the 
perspective of the community, their inclusion removes a lot of preconceived constraints 
on what is traditionally included in a stimulus bill, allowing actors to strategize in light of 
this new opportunity as described in the IAD and MSF. 
  Now that the problem solution categories are defined by H.R.1, meeting criteria 
for survival is the next big obstacle. In this case, the speed and feasibility of 
implementation will limit some policy ideas because they need to be implemented 
quickly, easily, and stimulate the economy almost immediately. S&T however is well 
positioned for this argument.   
  The MSF places particular importance on this aspect of a policy idea. Kingdon 
explains that policy ideas which make their way into a bill have already reached some 
census within the community about its feasibility and implementation abilities, before 
they reach serious consideration in Congress. So in other words, S&T argues they are 
ready, willing, and able to stimulate the economy, if appropriated enough funds.   
Lobbying frenzy 
   “When a window opens, it is too late to work up proposals from scratch; 
proposals must be ready long before that” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 227). S&T policy proposals 
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are ready to go for a long time, as evidenced through recent initiatives and laws passed in 
Congress. Once the House draft is released, the S&T community is well positioned, 
informed, and connected to provide information and support for S&T’s continued 
inclusion in the bill. The following quote explains how the community perceived this.  
Science Policy fellow: [We were] not sure science would be in the bill until the House 
numbers came out. [Representative] Obey and the Speaker put [science] in there. 
That’s when the push for science in my organization came- that’s when we knew 
science would be part of it, so we mobilized our members to tell their [congressional] 
delegations to support the House numbers. The big push for science originated in the 
House. 
 
  Pleasantly surprised to be included in the House’s first draft of the bill, the S&T 
community hit the ground running with advocacy and thank you letters for S&T’s 
inclusion in the bill. Looking through the MSF lens, the S&T community knows that 
even though they are included in the first draft, this does not guarantee their survival. 
They now need to quickly strategize, contact the right people, and use the right 
justifications to meet survival criteria. The quote below notes strategies being considered.  
Personal notes taken during an S&T strategy meeting: They started off by talking 
about what numbers people were expecting to see in the ominous [FY09] bill and the 
Senate stimulus bill… They are afraid that the Senate will only want to fund 
infrastructure projects and not research projects because Senators may not see the 
connection of research and job creation.  
 
…They felt they really needed to reach out to Senate Republicans because all House 
republicans voted ‘No’ on the stimulus. They don’t want the [Senate] Republicans 
coming up with amendments to make cuts in science. They stressed they need a one 
pager that stresses the job creation potential of investing in science.… They [also] 
stressed that [their strategy] has to be a top down approach. They have to have a 
negotiating position with the senators not just the staff.  
 
  Additional lobbying efforts include science and higher education organizations 
contacting their memberships with “action alerts” which ask them to communicate their 
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support for S&T in the ARRA with their Congressmen. The respondent below illustrates 
the process and the reaction of his membership.  
Representative from a scientific association: [We] have two types of emails we 
normally send out. One is informational…then we have action alerts, which we try to 
use sparingly so people won’t ignore them. Normally… it has to go through a process 
and the council has to approve it, but because of the timing and fast pace of things 
that were happening, the action alert - telling members to advocate for increases- was 
fast tracked through the approval process and only the President of [the organization] 
signed it.  
…We did get some push back from members. Some because they were against 
the whole stimulus bill in general, others thought it made the [organization] look 
greedy. They weren’t happy that [we] were sending out action alerts making members 
go and advocate for the bill. Some even said that they were quitting [the organization] 
because of the action alert – but my boss told me that they will probably rejoin once 
there is a conference.  
…I write the newsletters and a little bit ago I wrote about how you have to 
advocate for science with any vehicle that presents itself. [I learned] you are not 
going to make all members happy. [You can compare this] to the war supplement bill 
a couple years ago, there was pushback from members that were anti-war, but…you 
need to advocate for science when you have the chance, in any vehicle- and the 
stimulus bill was the vehicle this time.  
 
  The IAD describes this mobilization as necessary to get serious consideration  of 
policy ideas,  “since institutional processes necessarily require concerted action of many 
individuals, an especially critical function is filled by those entrepreneurs who offer 
appealing new visions or innovative practical solutions to governance problems” 
(McGinnis, 2011b, p. 171). Not only are regular organization members mobilized, 
lobbyists are also moving in full force to get their high profile people (i.e., CEOs,  
university presidents, heads of organizations, etc.) to contact Congress with phone calls, 
in person meeting, and multiple letters to ask for S&T survival in the bill.  
  Communication from these types of actors carries more weight with members of 
Congress then simple members in an organization who do not hold positions of authority 
within the S&T community. The quote below is a good example of this strategy and how 
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while the community needs the support of members of Congress, most the time, members 
of Congress need the support of communities as well.  
Personal notes taken during an S&T strategy meeting: [A lobbyist for a technology 
firm] asked if anyone knew any Senators that they could meet with and that could 
really help science get bigger numbers. One [lobbyist] suggested [a contact] who 
knew a chancellor that knew the Governor of New York (NY), who knew the new 
NY Senator, Kirsten Gillibrand. This could be helpful mainly because of the 
Brookhaven labs in NY. [The lobbyist] said that [Gillibrand] needs something like 
this to bring to the floor so that her constituency will vote for her when election 
time comes. And she also has had connections with IBM.  [She may be able to 
make a big] impact with an amendment for more science funding. 
 
  Along with mobilizing actors, the S&T community needs to adapt their message 
about what S&T can do for the economy. They change their message from sustained 
annual base budget increases, to the need for a one time infusion of funds that will create 
and maintain thousands of jobs.  This means they will have to explicitly frame science as 
economically simulative, which conflicts with their past arguments and risks future 
lobbying efforts, making some in the community hesitant about receiving any stimulus 
money. As the quote below suggests, they are willing to take the risk.  
Political consultant: The story about how…the stimulus [became] more important is 
interesting. The rules is never turn down an advocacy option and always try and see if 
you have a chance, particularly if that chance is related to DOE and facilities. There 
were two conflicting arguments when advocating for being in stimulus in the 
beginning:  research is simulative, an economic argument or when other roads and 
transportation projects are being built, some [projects] should be related to science.  
 
Then a third argument developed, the economy is stimulated because of the 
workforce impacts, [therefore] the scientific workforce is important. The scientific 
community found the pipeline was the strongest argument. That the research 
community enables the economy and if the U.S. is to lead, we must lead with STEM 
workforce… 
 
 Both the MSF and IAD are helpful to understand this change in lobbying strategy. 
Ostrom explains, “individuals may change their strategies over time as they learn more 
about the results of past actions” (2005, p. 64). The buildup of the transition team, 
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Obama and Pelosi’s public statements about S&T, and now the fact that they are 
included in the bill, makes the S&T community more willing to accept the risks of one 
time stimulus funding, than to weather the economic situation alone.  
  MSF describes the same concept a bit differently. Because Congress members see 
a consensus about S&T’s abilities concerning the economy, the next step for the 
community to observe how the streams are merging and take the appropriate action to 
make it through the policy window that is wide open. MSF explains this change in 
message as an adaptation required for survival in the bill. Also Kingdon (1995) further 
explains that when policy windows open, “participants of all types conclude the 
bandwagon is rolling and that they should be active in shaping the outcome” (p. 161). 
This is precisely what the S&T community does because as the MSF explains a 
successful lobbyist knows what is happening in the streams and what is required to 
survive. Adaptations of policy ideas are almost always necessary.   
  Pelosi states several times that while the bill is supposed to have recovery impacts 
in the short run by creating and maintaining jobs, targeting the recession, and allowing 
for tax relief, it is also going to make long run investments that will serve as a new 
foundation for the future U.S. economy (Krawzak & Clarke, 2009). She specifically 
mentions the role of science and energy investments included in the bill that are intended 
to assist in the transformation of the economy (Wolfe, 2009).  
  Actors in the S&T community note that the bill should really be two separate 
bills. 
From an S&T strategy meeting: This should be two bills in reality, one about 
recovery for stimulus right away and spending. And another for reinvestment, 
where research would be more appropriate. But since they are two bills Senators 




However, as a lobbyist for a scientific society commented, “they didn’t call it the 
American Stimulus Act for a reason”, so it is necessary for S&T to make both arguments 
in order to stay included in the bill.  
  Some members of Congress also agree separate bills will make more sense, one 
Senator insightfully comments, “I think the general rule is to do all you can when you 
can” (Clarke & Krawzak, 2009a). This is telling about how issues are molded to fit into 
the bill, and adds a bit of truthfulness to Republican criticism about the stimulus bill 
being more of an opportunity for the Democratic agenda then a pure stimulus bill. As one 
senior congressional staffer explains to me, the bill “turned into big Christmas tree.” He 
claims a lot of funding requests are not related to the economy and “should have gone 
through the regular appropriations process”. 
  Here is where the MSF can explain what was happening by relying on the 
Garbage Can Model. “[A]n organization is a collection of choices looking for problems, 
issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions 
looking for issues to which they might be the answer, and decision makers looking for 
work” (Cohen et al, 1972, p. 2). The S&T community has many policy idea choices that 
are ready to be attached to a problem, and the ARRA is a perfect venue to air their pet 
solutions as the answer to recovering and reinvesting in the economy.  
  Another important concept the GCM puts forth is that decision opportunities and 
situations exist within organizations and the solutions that are present, ready, and feasible 
are likely to be chosen, not based on merit or appropriateness to the situation, but based 
on timing and organizational structure.  In the case of the stimulus bill and S&T, it is 
already established that S&T is present and has a feasible solution. What they need to 
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work on is their arguments of readiness to get the funds out the door and put people to 
work.   
Politics and tactics 
  It seems in every step of this bill there are procedural tactics and politics at play. 
For example, some of the 206 amendments that are proposed in the House are more 
symbolic than serious proposals made by members. Some want to get their policy 
positions on record and others want to get a floor vote on their long awaited policy goals. 
Either way it is never expected or intended that all amendments will get a shot for a floor 
vote, or make their way into the bill (Allen, 2009).  
  Some Republicans feel the bill will pass anyways and want to get their language 
in the bill, but do not intend to vote for it (Rubin, & Ota 2009).   The following quote 
notes this strategy. 
Political consultant: The fact that everyone rolled over and let [NIH receive] $10 
billion, [shows] there was a lot behind the scenes going on. We know a lot of 
Republicans support NIH…but can’t visible support [the stimulus bill]. Besides, they 
knew it would pass, they knew [there was] enough votes to carry it. It’s like 
basketball, doesn’t matter by how many points you win by, and it’s about winning. 
[It’s like Republicans said], ‘I care about this but not voting for it.  
 
  Another example is Georgia Senator Johnny Isakson, who offers an amendment 
that makes it into the Senate bill, even though he is against the bill from the start. His 
amendment is later dropped from the final version (Clarke, 2009c). These types of tactics 
are controversial, yet not uncommon, and allowable by the Congressional rules. 
Republican resistance 
  Republican concerns are at the forefront of the stimulus debate. The ratio of tax 
cuts to spending is a contentious issue between the parties (Allen, 2009). It seemed clear 
from the beginning that the Republicans will be united in their opposition and are gearing 
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up for a fight. They resist Democratic spending proposals because they want to have 
more tax cuts and reduce spending (Clarke & Schatz 2009; Epstein 2009a) 
 This lack of bipartisanship had many explanations on both sides. “With such a 
huge emphasis on being bipartisan, it seems like it is putting more pressure to be 
partisan” (personal observation, January 27, 2009). For Republicans especially, the 
looming 2010 elections are a big motivator for a unanimous Republican opposition to 
spending billions of tax payers’ dollars in the stimulus bill.  Distinguishing themselves 
from Democratic decisions is of great interest to Republicans because they then will be 
able to make claims of voting against the bill in hopes that the stimulus bill will not have 
much of an impact. This way they can potentially sway fiscally conservative voters to 
vote Republican in 2010 in order to gain more seats in Congress and reduce the power of 
the Democrats in both chambers.  
  However, polls show popular support for the stimulus bill.  As a journalist for 
higher education comment in a meeting, “the Republicans are putting their political 
reputations on the line for the stimulus not to work”.  By doing this, they are putting 
themselves in a risky position (Clarke & Krawzak, 2009b).  
 Concerns about the stimulus bill   
  The stimulus bill is seen differently by different people. From my interviews, 
some feel it was simply a catch all bill for a pent up Democratic agenda that does not 
surface during the Bush administration while others feel it is a necessary spending bill 
that will deliver enough impact to provide for recovery from the recession.  
  The concerns over the provisions in the bill essentially come down to judgment 
calls. MSF’s survival criteria are whether policy ideas will actually create jobs on the 
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short term. Not only are they supposed to create jobs, but they are supposed to only need 
temporary federal funding. Lawmakers do not  want to “create unrealistic expectations 
for future spending programs” that will continue on and require additional funds down 
the road, like some of the New Deal programs did (Krawzak & Clarke, 2009b).  
The cost of the bill is also a major concern due to its effect on the nation’s deficit. 
Some question where the money will come from. An industry representative says in a 
meeting, “How do we pay for this? There are three things that can happen: taxes will 
increase; [we] could dodge [raising taxes] by inflation - the hidden tax; or we can borrow 
money [that] will not be available for the future (Krawzak, 2009). 
  There are also fears of misuse of funds or that the recipients will be unable to 
spend the money as quickly as expected (Schatz & Rubin, 2009). Adding to this 
speculation is a Congressional Budget office  (CBO) report which states a lot of the 
funding will not be able to be spent until 2010 (Krawzak & Clarke 2009a; Krawzak & 
Clarke 2009b). To suppress these claims, Democrats state they had received assurances 
from the recipients that the money will be spent as quickly as possible (Krawzak & 
Clarke 2009a). 
  Recipients such as NSF, NIH, and DOE are good candidates to receive funding 
because of the speed they can spend the funds- meeting the survival criteria. The core of 
these agency’s administrative missions is the evaluation of incoming project proposals 
and the efficient disbursement of funds. Therefore, they already have the infrastructure 
and experience that will allow for rapid disbursement (Tollefson, 2009).  
  In attempting to meet the survival criteria, stories are floating around that many 
Federal science agencies, such as NSF have a backlog of projects that have already been 
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reviewed and approved, but are not funded because of constraints in the budget, so 
essentially they have projects ready to go, people ready to be employed, all they need is 
the cash (Mervis, 2009b).  
  Criteria of survival do not have an obvious place in the IAD. It can show up 
within the information sets of actors, the values of actors in position in the action 
situation, or in the evaluative criteria after the decision is made. If we assume the criteria 
resides in the mental models created from actor information sets, the IAD leads us to 
assume S&T already meets some criteria due to S&T’s history in Congress, and now it is 
a matter of overcoming obstacles to survive in the stimulus bill.   
  In the past, the action situation for S&T appropriations is always constrained by 
the size of the discretionary budget, a place where S&T usually misses out. In the past it 
is not that S&T is not considered an important value, it just is not valued as high to meet 
the final survival criteria to receive sufficient appropriations. In the stimulus bill, there is 
a somewhat unlimited budget which changes the structure of the action situation allowing 
S&T to successfully garner sufficient appropriations if the rest of the action situation is 
structured in their favor.    
Actors 
  The tasks of S&T lobbyists are twofold at this point. They worked towards 
assembling their resources to educate their members of Congress as to the economic 
benefits of S&T. Not only are they advocating national benefits that will result from S&T 
funding, but also the local district benefits that will result for each member due to funding 
local construction and employing people at local universities and labs. At the same time, 
organizations continue to send out action alerts to motivate their memberships to contact 
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their individual congressional representatives, informing them of their desire for S&T to 
be funded in the ARRA.   
  MSF describes what is happening in the S&T community pretty perfectly, 
“advocates lie in wait in and around government with their solutions at hand, waiting for 
problems to float by to which they can attach their solutions, waiting for the development 
in the political stream they can use to their advantage” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 165).  And 
they certainly do take advantage of the crisis.  
  In the IAD, Ostrom explains, “combining biophysical outcomes, external payoffs, 
and participants’ interval valuation into one measure is useful for making decisions in a 
static setting” (2005, 43). This is also a good description of how things are playing out for 
S&T. With each of these elements, S&T is seen in a positive light as a feasible and valid 
solution in the stimulus bill.  
Stakes rising 
  Because the bill’s purpose is to respond to an urgent economic crisis, it is 
frequently framed by Obama, Pelosi, Obey and other members of Congress as getting 
worse with each day of inaction (Clarke & Krawzak, 2009c; Schatz & Clarke 2009a;  
Clarke, Schatz, & Krawzak 2009; Rubin, R. & Schatz 2009). Unemployment is getting 
worse, deficits are skyrocketing, and economic chaos lay in the wings. By February 6, the 
Labor Department reports 598,000 jobs were lost in the month of January alone (Rubin, 
Schatz, Krawzak & Clarke, 2009) 
  Congressional leaders felt prolonging passage of the bill or doing nothing is not a 
real option. Some lawmakers feel that the bill will be packaged in a way that will lead 
people to believe that their government is working correctly, and in turn lead to 
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confidence in the U.S economy on a global level, and therefore increase consumer 
spending (Ornstein, 2009). 
 Many do agree that the bill is not perfect (Clarke, 2009b; Epstein 2009e). Senator 
Amy Klobuchar says, “It’s not a perfect bill from my perspective, and I don’t agree with 
everything that’s in it and everything that came out, but literally we can’t afford to wait 
any longer to get something passed” (Rubin & Schatz, 2009). 
  Obama also comments, “let’s not make perfect the enemy of the essential”, 
suggesting that something is better than nothing (Clarke, Schatz & Krawzak, 2009). A 
report written by Mark Zandi, conservative economist and founder of Moody’s 
economy.com says, compared to doing nothing, the package will indeed create 
employment and aid in recovery by providing a boost to the economy (Krawzak & 
Clarke, 2009b). 
  This context serves as a powerful symbol to the public, members of Congress, and 
lobbyists. Symbols such as the economy getting worse with each day of inaction and 
global instability helps to reinforce that action is needed and is going to be taken by 
Congress, as interpreted by the MSF. With this information about the changes in the 
worsening biophysical attributes in the IAD, actors assume that Congress is going to pass 
a bill, regardless of the criticisms surrounding content, process, and partisanship.   
  Moving forward, based on the House draft of the stimulus, the S&T community 
seems to be in a good place and is able to meet the major survival criteria of the bill. 
Kingdon describes, the streams have aligned and the window of opportunity is open. 




POLICY ENVIRONMENT AFTER THE SENATE DRAFT WAS RELEASED 
 Senate bill and ensuing panic 
  The action situation and streams change dramatically for the S&T community 
when the Senate releases their draft of the stimulus bill. Although S&T is included, the 
numbers are less generous compared to what the House passed. For example, where the 
House proposes $3 billion for NSF, the Senate only proposes $1.5 billion. After seeing 
the Senate numbers, the S&T community’s mood changes, from a mood of thankfulness 
to assuming the worst. There are rumors that the House is angry at the Senate’s S&T 
numbers, but the Senate says they do not know that initial House numbers would be so 
high (personal observation, February 4, 2009). 
As a result, a change in strategy takes place within the S&T community. They go 
on the offensive and begin advocating aggressively in the Senate for an increase in funds 
to match the House numbers, as one lobbyist comments during an S&T strategy meeting. 
They particularly target Republicans in the Senate who do not fully understand the 
importance of S&T in the economy, whereas before they were targeting both parties, 
reinforcing their policy ideas with those who already believe it. Compounding their fears 
is the fact that not one Republican in the House votes for the bill. Even though the House 
didn’t need any Republican votes, the Senate does. It needs every Democratic vote, as 
well as a couple of Republicans to pass the bill. 
  The S&T community then develops several one pagers to be circulated in the 
Senate targeting moderate and conservative Republicans, advocating the job creation 
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potential of investing in S&T with the goal of getting Senate Republicans to support a bill 
that includes S&T funding in the Senate version.  
  The community also realizes that the Democrats who are in the majority will 
likely have the final say of what is included in the bill and they do not want to lose sight 
of them. It is a conscious defensive effort to seek out how the Democrats feel about S&T 
and assess who will be there to protect the S&T funding in the final conference report. 
  Both frameworks explain this change in message and strategy. Kingdon explains 
that we know S&T satisfies some criteria because it is included in both bills, but two 
things make the Senate reduce the numbers for S&T. First S&T falls short somewhere in 
the Senate’s criteria, and they receive smaller numbers. Another explanation is that the 
House’s leadership values science higher than the Senate and it is not due to a short fall 
in the S&T community’s message, relevance, or validity. It is simply a difference in 
values.  
  Regardless of why the numbers are lower, what the Senate numbers did was 
signal that the action situation was structured differently in the House and that actors 
need to adapt and evolve their message and strategies to account for this difference.  
  Therefore the IAD and MSF help us to understand the reason why ideas are 
forced to evolve and adapt as time passes in order to survive in conversations and 
therefore the bill. While the main idea of what S&T can do for the economy does not 
change, the underlying message of  ‘thanks for including us, we can definitely help the 
economy’ changed to ‘we deserve it and give us more…please’.   
  According to the IAD, actors change their direction due to the changes in 
information, which changes potential outcomes (getting less money), generating 
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interactions (aggressively targeting Republicans) which have intended outcomes 
(increases for S&T in the bill).  
Proposed cuts and yet another change in strategy  
  The difference of the House and Senate numbers are soon to be the least of the 
S&T community’s problems. Several turning points in the Senate threaten the inclusion 
of S&T funding.  A scandal surfaces in time to embarrass and possibly impact the S&T 
community. The community is actually aware of this issue weeks before, but do not do 
much about it, as the quote below explains.  
Personal notes from an S&T strategy meeting: Apparently a story leaked about 
abuses of NSF employees who were using company computers to look at porn. 
[Members in the meeting] are afraid that this may burn their entire initiative. They 
really want to know what NSF is doing so that Senators don’t get wind and chose not 
to support NSF. One person at the meeting said that 95% of funds to NSF go out the 
door, so it should be a big issue. Another said we have bigger fish to fry and not to 
worry about it. 
 
  Why they decided to ignore the possibility of the scandal leaking is not known , 
but a couple days later a Senator does catch wind of the story and in early February, 
Senator Chuck Grassley goes public with the information. He had obtained an Inspector 
General’s report that finds NSF employees using agency resources to look at and share 
pornography. This scandal which is referred to as the “NSF porngate” threatened not only 
NSF in the stimulus bill, but all of S&T’s reputation and future funding. Ultimately the 
scandal dissipates and NSF’s funds are left intact when NSF agrees to comply with 
Senators Grassley’s accountability stipulations.   
  After surviving that scandal, the S&T community is in for more bumps in the 
road. If ever there is a time the S&T funding is again very vulnerable to being seriously 
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removed from the bill, it is in early February when the Nelson-Collins amendment is 
released in the Senate.  
Q: Was there a point where you thought S&T would fall out of the bill? 
S&T committee staffer:  There were several times but when the Senate turned out the 
Nelson-Collins compromise to get 60 votes, they severely cut out a large portion of 
science funding, some more than others. At that point, there were Senate advocates 
but it was more about trimming what they can to get more votes…[I was] uncertain 
what the Nelson-Collins amendment would come up with and was not optimistic at 
all that they would  continue to support, [I know they were] not against science, but 
[it must have been about] what constitutes as stimulus and what doesn’t.  
 
  This amendment is written and introduced by a bipartisan group of Senators, 
called the “gang of moderates” who develop a list of cuts to the Senate’s version of 
H.R.1.  These cuts are not a result of prioritization, but an attempt to trim back the bill in 
order to negotiate for more votes for the Senate bill (personal observation, February 2, 
2009).  
  On February 5, the S&T community is alerted of specific cuts that are being 
proposed. The quote below shows how this unraveled.  
Personal notes from daily observation: There is a sense of panic right now. People in 
the sciences and academia a getting really worried about the science funding in the 
Senate… [As I was watching C-Span2 on my computer at work] I got this email 
simply called ‘Fwd: cuts document’ [with the message], ‘this would be bad’.  
 
The document was basically a list of all proposed things that were going to be cut out 
from the stimulus bill, [which included a] 100% cut for NSF. There are no markings 
on the document. They did that so that if it did get leaked (which it did, organization 
X found a way to get a hold of it), it wouldn’t be able to get back to whoever wrote it. 
The people who sent it are probably the "Gang of [moderates]" that is huddled in an 
office trying to compromise to get the three Republican votes. They wanted to see 
how most members feel about particular cuts to know what their negotiating power 
will be. 
 
  The MSF says that experienced lobbyists will know what this document means 
and what they need to do to influence and convince lawmakers that S&T is worthy of all 
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the originally proposed funds in the bill. An even more experienced lobbyist will know 
exactly who to contact and what to say.  
  This document sends the S&T community into hyper drive. It is unknown exactly 
who is part of this gang of moderates, but guesses are made and lobbyists are reaching 
out to any and all members of Congress asking them to not to allow cuts in S&T funding, 
leading to another change in their message. Survival is now the priority- not matching the 
Senate and House numbers. The message changes from increases to asking Senators to 
leave the numbers alone. A lobbyist at an S&T strategy meeting comments, “[we] don’t 
want to try and raise the numbers when everyone is trying to get the overall number 
down”. 
  Because the moderates seem to hold the cards on the Senate floor due to their 
voting power, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid permits debate to continue and 
amendments to be offered until he is sure he will have at least 60 votes to pass the bill 
and avoid a Republican filibuster (Schatz & Clarke, 2009b).  Reid eventually gets the 
assurance of a 60 vote passage of the bill after a compromise with the moderates is 
reached (Rubin, Schatz, Krawzak, & Clarke, 2009). By February 8, the Senate is ready to 
vote to invoke cloture, ending Senate debate on the bill- with S&T funds intact (Rubin & 
Schatz, 2009) 
  The Senate finally approves its amended version of the House bill on February 10, 
with three key Republican votes, 61-36. The Nelson-Collins compromise amendment 
essentially levels the playing field and sets the tone for the rest of the stimulus debate.  
This amendment is significant because it signals the weight that a few Senators have 
during the conference negotiations and final votes on the bill. Although S&T survived in 
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the Senate bill, as reflected in just about all my interviews, the community is never 100% 
sure it will stay in until the final bill is signed by the President.  
Q: Was there a point where you thought S&T would fall out? 
Lobbyist for a scientific society: It could have fallen out anywhere along the way. The 
big moment was if they would even consider it. Another was would the whole thing 
tank, not just S&T but the whole bill…They had to get 3 Republican players. The 
House had good numbers and the Senate had lower numbers for science. So in the 
conference everyone expected them to split difference. Out of conference, turns out 
that they didn’t split the difference, and the numbers [for science] stayed close to the 
House numbers. That was a big surprise.  
 
Conference negotiations 
  At this point in the story, lobbying is coming from all sides. Companies are 
encouraging employees to contact their delegations on company time. The White House, 
specifically Obama and Rahm Emmanuel, go to the Capital Hill to lobby Democratic 
Senators to vote in unison on the bill. Also,  a S&T committee staffer comments to me 
that congressional committees chimed in to support provisions that are within their 
jurisdiction and Pelosi is encouraging members of Congress to “intensify the drumbeat 
across the country” to stimulate support for the bill among their constituencies before 
conference negotiations start (Roth, 2009; Rubin, Schatz, Krawzak, & Clarke, 2009).  
  Advice that is flowing through the S&T community is not to worry about the 
Senate or House numbers at this point, but to concentrate on the conference negotiations 
because as a senior congressional staffer suggests at an S&T strategy meeting, “things are 
going to be traded back and forth”. They are also advised by the same staffer to start 
writing editorials in newspapers and get the word out publicly about S&T’s abilities, as 
well as to start targeting federal agencies, such as the DOE, and help them communicate 
how they will spend the money quickly if they receive it.   
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  The advice of forgetting the past and worrying about surviving in the next phase 
is very reminiscent of the MSF because it allows the analyst to move on and forget that 
the numbers in the Senate are lower. The next step of survival is the only relevant 
strategy moving forward.   
  The IAD is based on the idea that “somehow as individuals we implicitly make 
sense of … diverse and complex situations” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 4). Humans cognitively 
understand nuances of situations which in turn affect expectations of ourselves and other 
people. In this case, actors are able to sense a change and they change their behavior 
accordingly.  
Conference report 
  When it comes to writing the conference report, it will be up to ten conference 
committee members, five from each chamber chosen by each chamber’s leadership. The 
House conferees were: Appropriations Chairman David Obey, Ways and Means 
Chairman Charlie Rangel, Energy and Commerce Chairman Henry Waxman, 
Appropriations ranking member Jerry Lewis, and Ways and Means ranking member 
Dave Camp.  Senate conferees were: Majority Leader Harry Reid, Finance Chairman 
Max Baucus, Appropriations Chairman Daniel Inouye, Finance ranking member Chuck 
Grassley, and Appropriations ranking member Thad Cochran.  
  The usual expectation is that once both House and Senate pass their versions of 
the bill, the conference committee will then negotiate in the middle (Schatz, 2009).  
However, that is not what happens because of the nature of votes needed to pass the bill 
in the Senate (Schatz, 2009).  Pelosi even states that the conference bill will not be the 
usual “split the difference affair” (Rubin & Ota, 2009). The conference report is a chance 
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for the committee to insert or remove items to ensure votes in both chambers, especially 
in the Senate (Schatz, 2009).   
  The White House will have a lot of influence and will be very involved in the 
merging of the conference report (Clarke & Krawzak, 2009d).  It is clear that it comes 
down to three Republican Senators, Susan Collins, Arlen Specter, and Olympia Snowe, 
who are part of the gang of moderates and pared down the initial Senate version of the 
stimulus bill. Although they are not officially on the conference committee, they are an 
essential part of the negotiation process because it is their votes that are needed to make 
at least 60 votes in the Senate. 
  These three Senators do not want to see any changes from the bill’s total spending 
or any alterations to what they have amended during their previous negotiations. They 
make it clear if changes are made, their votes will be against the final bill, giving them 
essentially veto power (Schatz, 2009).  “House Democrats grumbled…about their 
stimulus ideas being held hostage by a handful of Senate Republicans” (Pierce, 2009a). 
However this is the reality and the price Obama and Democrats will have to pay to see 
the bill signed into law (Pierce, 2009b)  
Final bill 
  For the final bill to pass in both the House and Senate, every Democratic vote is 
needed. For instance, the Democrats are already down a Democratic vote due to Senator 
Kennedy’s critical condition battling brain cancer. Therefore, when Democratic Senator 
Sherrod Brown’s mother dies a day or two before the Senate is to vote on the final 
conference bill, he is flown out by the White House after the funeral to the Senate floor to 
cast his vote (Krawzak & Clarke, 2009c). 
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  In the end Snowe, Collins, and Specter are the only three Republicans in both 
chambers who vote for the bill out of 219. It is said that Republicans are “absolutely 
gleeful at their self-perceived political victory when they were unanimous in opposition” 
against the bill (Ornstein, 2009). Without those three Republican votes, the bill will not 
have made it through the Senate and it will have stalled any stimulus deal from moving 
forward.   
  Obama signs the bill which includes significant appropriations for S&T on 
February 17, in Denver, Colorado. In his speech he says this bill’s passage is a way of 
showing voters that he did come through on his campaign promises. The stimulus 
deadline set by Congressional leadership is met and action to save the U.S. economy is 
taken.  
  The final bill’s provisions are said to be purely political, not pragmatic numbers 
(Clarke, Schatz & Krawzak, 2009).  Interestingly, while many Republicans continued to 
publically condemn the bill, Collins and Specter report that some of their Republican 
colleagues came up to them after the vote and told them they are “glad to see this action 
taken without their fingerprints” (Krawzak & Clarke, 2009c). While not all of their 
colleagues are happy about the bill’s passage, perhaps the concessions they specifically 
receive in the bill make splitting from their party worth it.  
  To illustrate why these three Republicans think it is worth it to go against their 
party, a user perspective using the IAD is considered. Looking at Senator Spector and his 
perspective of the action situation reveals his intentions and motivations. Spector is a 
cancer survivor and therefore is a longtime supporter of NIH. For many years he has been 
considered a champion for science in Congress.  With his vote desperately needed to pass 
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the bill, it just so happens that the final bill he votes for included $10 billion for NIH - 
about $6 billion more than NIH had when the first House draft is released in early 
January.  Also this is more than any other science agency receives in the bill, such as 
NSF who received about $3 billion.  
  Considering the action situation from this perspective, the most relevant variable 
seems to have been the cost-benefit of voting against his party. The result is very much 
leaning towards the benefits side of securing $10 billion for NIH in exchange for the cost 
of voting against his party.  It is worth noting that later in 2009, Spector actually changes 
political parties and became a Democrat, this is evidence of Spector’s vote being based 
on his values, not his parties ideology, and the fact that voting against his party was 
probably not that big of a cost for him.  
  The MSF describes the importance of having congressmen support policy ideas, 
such as what played out with Spector’s vote. Kingdon explains advocates have a better 
chance of their policy idea’s inclusion if a politician finds their idea’s sponsorship 
convenient (1995, p. 172). From my observations, the community is aware of their active 
supporters, “champions of science” such as Spector and those who need more 
convincing.   
  The IAD describes when Congressional leaders really want to get something done 
they have the ability to make it happen- to a point. When there is a political majority, as 
was the case with the ARRA, for the most part, Congressional leaders control important 
procedural rules, decide on which actors are present in the writing and changing of 
legislation, such as the conference committee members, and the remaining structure of 
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the action situation can at times be manipulated in their favor.  However, this is not an 
easy task, nor was it intended to be by the Founding Fathers. 
  MSF’s idea of a window of opportunity is a perfect explanation of this. When 
leaders have the opportunity to control the right variables, to be able to manipulate the 
situation for their benefit, they will- but a lot of things need to be in place for this 
opportunity to happen.  For the ARRA, Congressional leaders are uniquely able to 
manipulate the situation in order to realize their goals, which include funding for S&T, 
because of an open window.  
  If this bill had been introduced at any other time, it is likely that the people, 
pressures, and justifications may not have come together as they did in early 2009, and 
the ARRA would never have been passed. In the words of the MSF, the streams may not 
have joined and a window would not have opened to allow the ARRA to make its way 
through Congress, let alone with funds for S&T.  At an earlier or later date, through the 
lens of the IAD, the action situation may not have been structured in a way to allow for 




AFTER ARRA’S PASSAGE 
 Moving forward 
  Science is funded in the bill because of its historical ability to positively affect the 
economy, and the fact that federal agencies have plenty of research projects that would be 
ready for implementation. They have been neglected for so long that champions for 
science in Congress- as well as outside Congress, recognized the opportunity and decided 
to support science in the bill, and without major opposition, it survived.  
  Science now has the task of proving, in a very tangible way, that they are worth it. 
They still need to communicate and present to Congress and the general public concrete 
evidence of impacts the ARRA funds have on the economy.   
  It is interesting to note that looking back in history, using S&T as a solution to a 
national crisis is actually not that unusual. When S&T receives significant federal 
funding and congressional attention, it is the result of being seen as a solution to either a 
real crisis or perceived crisis. As a lobbyist for a scientific society puts it, in the U.S. 
science is usually a “beneficiary of crises”. The quote below further explains this 
observation.  
Lobbyist for a scientific society:  A reporter had asked me to compare [the money 
S&T received in the stimulus bill] to something, but I couldn’t do it in terms of the 
money. It simply remains to be seen historically. Science has been the beneficiary of 
crises when it is seen as a solution. It wasn’t Sputnik that spurred the science 
investments, it was the perceived threat and Eisenhower using science as a way to 
solve the threat and beat the Soviets. Like 9-11, Bush could have [either] said we are 
going to use science…to fight terrorists or we will go overseas and find Sadam 





  In the end the S&T community is critical for garnering funds in the stimulus bill, 
even if they didn’t lobby for inclusion in the beginning. At a celebration event after the 
ARRA is passed,  Speaker Pelosi who is being honored for her advocacy commented, 
“None of this would have been possible without the mobilization of the outside scientific 
community” (Mervis, 2009a, p. 24). It seemed once members of Congress are armed with 
constituent requests, national, and district benefits, job creation numbers, the stories of 
past successes, and consequences of past neglect, S&T funding turns into a rational 
solution for recovery and reinvestment for our future economy, despite all the bumps in 
the road in the political process.   
Lessons learned 
  As a bill moves through Congress, its contents are always up for negotiation and 
are always vulnerable for removal at any point in the process. This is very much the case 
with the stimulus bill. When Obama meets with Republican leaders on January 27, in a 
bipartisan effort,   Obama tells Republicans that the House version is “far from the final 
version” (Epstein & Ota, 2009).  Meaning, even though the bill is agreed upon by a 
majority of members in the House, it is likely that the contents will be altered.  
  . Some in the House and Senate admit to passing the first versions of the bill even 
though they do not agree with its contents, simply to keep the process moving (Krawzak, 
2009). For example, the House Blue Dog Coalition sent a letter to Pelosi stating that 
although they voted for the first draft of the bill, they are expecting to see a lot of changes 
to the final report in order for them to vote on its final passage (Ota, 2009). Moderates in 
the Senate also wanted to hear from Obama that the spending would be decreased while 
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in conference, instead of on the Senate floor (Schatz & Clarke 2009b; Schatz & Clarke, 
2009c).  
  The unpredictability of the whole process is what can make or break some issues. 
The way an issue starts out in a piece of legislation, does not predict the way it will look 
in the end.  In the case of NIH, they receive more than either chamber initially proposes 
when the bill comes of the conference committee.  
Assessment of the frameworks 
  For a good understanding of policy making, frameworks should offer a set of 
tools and outlines which can at least “tell the observer what to look for… [and be able to] 
define the categories in which phenomena are to be grouped” (Sabatier, 2007, p. 4).  Both 
frameworks offer such questions, structure, language and a visualization of the policy 
process.  
  The MSF and IAD emphasize observing and assessing actor characteristics 
because they affect if and how policies change. They both assume actors have the 
capacity to perceive the subtleties of each situation and act according to those differences. 
This is one of the strengths of both frameworks because they ask questions about actors 
to explain policy making behavior. The story of the S&T appropriations within the 
stimulus bill is a story about actors in and around government, with or without formal 
authority, strategizing to influence the contents on the bill.  
  They both do not intend for their frameworks to specifically predict outcomes. 
They acknowledge the process is quite complex and near to impossible to precisely 
predict. Instead they both aim to understand probabilities of possible outcomes as a more 
realistic approach to understanding an ever-evolving policy environment.  
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  They are able to aid in the telling and structuring the story, as well as point to 
which variables contributed to higher probabilities of S&T’s inclusion, such as: a feasible 
policy idea, an urgent problem pressing for government action, a history in Congress, 
leaders and those in formal authority willing to support S&T- or at least not oppose its 
inclusion-, and an active network of stable advocacy professionals.  
  They both look for inequalities and the history of experience within the policy 
communities which can affect incentives. While they place them in different areas of 
their frameworks, they both lead the analyst to characterize differences among those in 
the community, which is useful to develop assumptions about future behavior and 
community interpretations of events. In the case of the stimulus bill, this was useful in 
explaining why the community was not trying to lobby for stimulus funds until after they 
are already included in the bill.   
  One of the biggest differences between the two frameworks is their concern with 
the origin of an idea or policy. Kingdon focuses on what is happening at the moment and 
how that idea survives, not who or why an idea got to that place. Ostrom on the other 
hand, is very much interested in the origin of an idea.  The IAD is designed to be able to 
track the history of an idea in order to get the most information about a situation as 
possible.  
  For this case study, how S&T is inserted in the first bill is unclear, but the 
summary of its history is telling about its acceptability in the minds of Congress. 
However, it may not be very fruitful to track down who inserted it and why S&T was 
originally included in the bill. For Kingdon, the only important thing is that it is there and 
what   actors are going to do to keep it there.  
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  Another difference between the two is the perspective that they are both 
developed from.  The research that led to the development of the MSF is based on case 
studies in Congress, specifically tracking federal legislation over a span of four years. So 
Kingdon’s framework draws from a similar political environment as seen in this case 
study. Ostrom’s work stems from her interest in common pool resources and how people 
in the communities are managed by institution and rules.  She is also very much 
interested in implementation and interpretation of rules and actions, searching for a way 
to improve the condition of people and society’s welfare.  
  For this case study, the MSF guides the analysis through the Congressional policy 
process, making the MSF seem more applicable to this case study, but does not discount 
the IAD. The IAD is simply more difficult to apply because of some ambiguities of 
variables that are not obviously relevant to Congress and making legislation.  A brief 
assessment of strength and weakness will explain this a bit further.   
Strength and weaknesses of the IAD 
  The basic unit of analysis, the action situation, is a key strength for the IAD, as 
well as the ability to tailor the level of detail to different cases in a macro and micro 
perspective. For this case, the IAD allows an analyst to talk about specific action 
situations from the perceptive of any actor of interest. This is in contrast to the MSF, 
which is less specific about static decision situations and focuses more on the flow and 
movement of decisions in each stream.  
  The biggest weakness of the IAD is its complexity and definitions. Because a lot 
of the details are unknown, a lot of assumptions need to be made in an attempt to make 
implicit information about a situation be explicit in the analysis. Also a stable policy 
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environment makes this type of analysis easier. In the case of S&T policy, the IAD fell 
short because of the extreme unpredictability.    
  While Ostrom specifically designed this framework to be very detailed, it is not 
always intuitive, which makes application cumbersome and sometimes confusing. The 
IAD intends to create a common vocabulary and structure that can be applied to all policy 
making situations, but in doing this, it forces the analyst to learn new definitions and 
assumptions instead of intuitively using their own. Over time this is actually a strength of 
the IAD, because it can lead to more consistent inquiries across analyses. However, the 
learning curve is steep for a novice.  Overtime, as familiarity grows, this framework will 
allow for the accumulation learning about the same phenomena across disciplines.    
  As Ostrom points out, her emphasis on the role of rules in policy making leaves a 
gap in the understanding of other equally important factors such community and 
biophysical characteristics. Further explanation of these elements is needed.   
  During the stimulus debate, the rules of each chamber definitely affect the 
structure of the action situations, controlling debates and amendments, but community 
norms also had a significant role of changing behavior and affecting the policy outcome. 
Had the S&T community not been ready to mobilize, adapt, and provide information to 
Congress, they may not have stayed in the bill.   
  When an institution involves volatility, a variety of competing goals, and 
countless actors in and around the institution, the structure of the IAD can lead to a very 
problematic analysis. Most of Ostrom’s work deals with institutional statements, their 
intentions and outcomes, as well as property rights and common pool resources, which 
seem to have different boundaries and dynamics at play then in highly political and 
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unpredictable S&T policy institutions, such as Congress.  Perhaps given more time, the 
IAD will be tested in highly irregular political settings to allow for more elucidation of 
how the IAD is applied to government institutions that have such a diverse set of actors 
and conflicting intentions and goals.  
  The IAD can help lead to assumptions about the probability of what is next on the 
agenda. In terms of broadly predicting policy choices, as extrapolated from my study, 
IAD is very complex and can assess the wide range of issues floating around at the time. 
This may lead to an irrelevant investigation because it may not be known who will be an 
actor in the action situation of the future.  Instead, for this case study, the IAD was 
helpful as an additional to the MSF in providing structure, questions, and vocabulary. 
Strength and weaknesses of the MSF 
  The MSF is less formal when applying it to the story of the stimulus bill. The 
flexibility of the framework allows for more intuition and customization to the case at 
hand and allows for the environment to be quite unstable. Actually this seems to be a 
great strength of the MSF.   
  The MSF is set up in loosely coupled stream so organizing information into three 
distinct streams is an intuitive process due to the distinct differences he describes in each 
stream.  However, this flexibility may be a weakness because inconsistent applications 
and interpretations across fields and case studies may develop. Kingdon asserts that the 
policy process is too fluid and ever-changing to fit into one concept, theory, or model, so 
this flexibility is what he intended.   
  Another strength of using MSF for my case is the fact that Kingdon perform 
similar case studies, but on a greater empirical scale. Although all of my data was all 
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qualitative, I am able to use his case studies as examples to learn from, and to guide me 
through his framework, unlike the IAD. The MSF helps to explain how the stimulus bill 
gets on the agenda, as well as it to shows how the streams merged to allow S&T to be a 
serious alternative in the final bill. This framework articulated elements well enough to 
observe them in my case.  As he mentioned, there are no particular elements that must 
exist, but there are particular streams and momentums that need to take place in order to 
have higher probabilities of a policy adoption.  
  Kingdon (1995) puts the responsibility of joining the three streams on the policy 
entrepreneurs. He describes them as “surfers waiting for the big wave” (p. 225). This 
process becomes clear in the stimulus bill because the S&T community does, in a sense, 
ride the wave started by the House draft numbers.  This is an opportunistic framework 
that puts the power in organized people, rather than in powerful politicians and 
government officials. The story of the stimulus and S&T is definitely a story about the 
S&T community adapting their proposal for survival in the form of congressional 
appropriations.  
  One of the major criticisms of the MSF is that it does not present a testable 
hypothesis (Sabatier, 2007). Concerns about the ability to empirically test a hypothesis 
resulting from this framework is also a common weakness of any qualitative case study 
approach.   Another criticism comes from the structure of the MSF and its independent 
streams. Some scholars feel that these streams are actually interdependent, and policies 
are not always developed in the policy community and sometimes solutions to problems 
get matched in the absence of an open window (Sabatier, 2007).  In this respect, using my 
case as an example, I feel that thinking of the streams as independent is useful and 
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actually a strength. Not only for organization and making sense of a complex world, but 
in pushing an analyst to ask questions they would not have otherwise asked if we had 
assumed the streams are not separate and directly affected another.   
  Both frameworks are helpful in collecting information, asking questions, and 
forming assumption about the process. Together they allow for the organization of a large 
amount of information to make some sense of the complex world of federal policy 
making.  While they differ in the ways, they approach understanding the case, in the end, 
a combination of both of them strengthen the analysis. 
  The search for understanding policy processes is a search for relationships, 
linkages, hypothesis, and a way to aggregate information across fields about the same 
phenomena. Combining these two frameworks seems to bring us one step closer to at 
least developing a way to accumulate knowledge and express relevant variables which 
influence the policy making processes. 
Conclusion 
  As political theory emerges from its nascent stages in the 21st century, combining 
frameworks allows for broader understating of process in policy making. While the two 
frameworks have a different utility for this case, have different languages, structures, and 
foundations, they share a similar basic assumption about policy making. Actors with 
resources and authority (formal or informal) have control over policy outcomes when 
they can accurately observe and interpret changes in social attributes and political factors 
related to the current policy environment. 
 One reason these two frameworks have different utilities may be due to the 
volatile nature of the S&T policy environment. As history shows, there is soft bipartisan 
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support for S&T in Congress, but it is almost always a runner up when it comes time for 
serious financial support.  This can most noticeably be seen in the lack of funds resulting 
from the COMPETES Act.  However, even though S&T is vulnerable to a lot of talk and 
no action, it can also fall on the other side of the spectrum and win big in unexpected 
ways, as we saw in the ARRA.   
 In addition to the unpredictability of garnering Federal funds every year, S&T 
communities have a small constituency making them vulnerable in the big scheme of 
things. Therefore, S&T has to be especially strategic about their mobilization efforts and 
messages to Congress. This means that observing the current policy environment in and 
around Congress is quite crucial in order to appropriately assess their chances of 
inclusion.  
 These characteristics of science policy- volatility, vulnerability, and runner up 
status are what lent themselves so well to being applied to the MSF. The MSF is about 
assessing probabilities and perceiving a variety of unforeseen variables which change 
overtime in order to form a bigger picture about winning and losing.  This is very telling 
about the scope of MSF because while it may not be very useful when applied to issues 
such as Medicare policy which is quite stable and not likely to change drastically year to 
year, it illuminates important unique variables that can make it or break it for unstable, 
somewhat expendable policy issues like S&T.   
 Conversely, the instability of S&T is what led the IAD to be a less fruitful 
framework. The IAD was deigned to assess relatively predictable, constant, and 
established policy processes in domains with quite different dynamics than S&T policy.  
Although the IAD is about observing and explaining policy environments, when that 
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environment is so uncertain, unstable and responding to a variety of different factors 
overtime, its usefulness and explanatory capacity is diminished. 
 In the end, the MSF leads us to conclude the success of S&T was due to their skill 
at monitoring the policy environment and being able to take advantage of the open policy 
window.  The S&T community argued successfully that if given funds in the ARRA, they 
could indeed accomplish the main goals set forth by the bill- having projects and 
programs ready to go, spending the money right away, and employing people 
immediately. This was an argument not all policy communities could make.  The makeup 
of the S&T community was also critical to their success. They are well connected, 
communicated quickly, and mobilized rapidly to make things happen to survive in the 
bill. Essentially, S&T correctly adapted their narrative and had the policy tools as well as 
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